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ARTICLES
THE GOVERNMENT AS FIDUCIARY: A PRACTICAL
DEMONSTRATION FROM THE REIGN OF TRAJAN
Robert G. Natelson*
Abstract: The Roman Emperor Trajan is justly celebrated as an
author of several modern civil rights, such as the right to confront
one's accusers. But he is most aptly remembered as the ruler who
proved that fiduciary government was possible. Following the ex-
ample of Trajan's reign could improve greatly the standards of
American public law.1
* Professor of Law, University of Montana; AB., Lafayette College; J.D., Cornell Law
School; Founder of the citizens' watchdog group Montanans for Better Government, and
Chair from 1993 to 1997. The author thanks Professor Andrew Morriss of Case Western
University Law School for his useful comments, and Margaret Boyer, Class of 2001 at the
University of Montana School of Law, for her research assistance.
1. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the Latin are those of the author.
Classical sources and citation forms are not familiar to most legally trained readers.
This article relies on a number of such works; those cited on multiple occasions include
those listed below. Like the Bible, most classical works are cited by book, chapter, and
verse, for example, DIG. 1.4.13.
(1) SExTus AURELIUs VICTOR, LIER DE CAESARIBUS: PRAECEDUNT ORiGO GENTIS
ROMANAE ET LIBER DE VIRIS ILLUSTRIBUS URBIS ROMAE SUBSEQUITUR EPITOME DE
CAESARIBUS (R. Gruendel ed., 1970) (1901) [hereinafter VICTOR] (a fourth century book of
short imperial biographies, in Latin).
(2) ANONYmiOUS, EPITOmE, in VICTOR, supra [hereinafter EPIT.] (another fourth century
book of short biographies of Roman emperors, in Latin).
(3) GAIUS, INSTITUTES (Francis de Zulueta trans., 1969) (1947) [hereinafter G. INST.] (a
second century A.D. elementary law textbook that served as the basis of Justinian's Insti-
tutes, in Latin).
(4) C. PLIN1US SECUNDUS, EPISTLES, in LETTERS AND PANEGYRICUS (E.H. Warmington
ed., Betty Radice trans., The Loeb Classical Library 1969) [hereinafter PL.EP.] (a book of
Latin letters written by a Roman senator who served Trajan in various capacities).
(5) C. PLINIUS SECUNDUS, PANEGYRICUS, in LETTERS AND PANEGYRICUS, supra [herein-
after PL.PAN.] (a Latin speech in praise of Trajan by the same senator).
(6) FLAVIUS JUSTINLANUS, CoRPus JURIS. The massive compilation of Roman law col-
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'We are the trustees and agents of our fellow citizens."
-Grover Cleveland, President of the United States
"A public office is a public trust."
-The rewrite by W.C. Hudson, Cleveland's Public Rela-
tions man 2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, both politicians and reformers frequently
declare that a public office is a public trust.3 Grover Cleveland's
actual remark, 'We are the trustees and agents of our fellow citi-
zens," better conveys the implications of the ideal. The primary
purposes of the trust are said to be those set forth in the Declara-
tion of Independence (the protection of natural human rights)4
and in the Preamble to the United States Constitution and vari-
ous state constitutions.'
lected by order of the Emperor Justinian (reigned A.D. 527-65). It includes the Codex
(COD.), the Digest (DIG.), and the Institutes (J. INST.). It is written mostly in Latin with an
occasional Greek passage.
(7) 8 DiO CASSIUS CocCEIANuS, Dio's ROMAN HISTORY (G.P. Goold ed., E. Cary trans.,
The Loeb Classical Library 1982) [hereinafter DIOI (a history of Rome composed in Greek
by a Roman senator of the late second and early third centuries).
(8) EUTROPIUS, BREVIARIUM (Franciscus Ruehl ed., 1901) [hereinafter EUT.] (a fourth
century book of short biographies of Roman emperors, in Latin).
(9) 1 ANONYMOUS, HISTORIA AUGUSTA (G.P. Goold ed., David Magie trans., The Loeb
Classical Library 1979) [hereinafter H.A.1 (a book of longer Latin biographies of Roman
Emperors, beginning with Hadrian, Trajan's successor; the biography of Hadrian is largely
factual; much later biographies are mostly fictional).
(10) SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, DE VITA CAESARUM, (E.H. Warmington ed., J.C. Rolfe
trans., The Loeb Classical Library 1951) [hereinafter SUET.] (the first and best of the
Latin imperial biographers).
2. After Grover Cleveland said, "We are the trustees and agents of our fellow citi-
zens," W.C. Hudson, a newspaper reporter then working for Cleveland, changed it to "a
public office is a public trust" with Cleveland's permission. To his credit, Cleveland always
admitted that the snappier line was not his. William Saire, How to Write a Memoir, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1988, at A23.
3. On March 25, 2001, there were 621 references to or paraphrases of the adage in
the Lexis database of news stories.
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (listing purposes that include domestic tranquillity
and the general welfare); MONT. CONST. pmbl. ("to improve the quality of life, equality of
opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty"). Some of the writings of the American
Founding Generation reflect the ideal of government as fiduciary. For example, the Feder-
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However, the maxim "The king can do no wrong"6 may be a bet-
ter description of the legal reality. There is no general fiduciary
obligation imposed on elected or higher appointed officials.7 In-
stead, the law provides only a series of ad hoc protections against
arbitrary action set forth in state and federal constitutions, bills
of rights, ethics laws, court rules, and various statutes, such as
those that waive sovereign immunity. I do not wish to imply that
such provisions are unimportant or insubstantial. But in our po-
litical and legal system, they are exceptions-concessions,
really-from the plenary authority wielded by the sovereign.8
If the law took seriously the notion that public service is a
public trust, it would hold government officials and employees,
including policymakers, to standards analogous to those imposed
on private fiduciaries. A legal regime that does not do so is an in-
vitation to political abuse.9 New York State Senator George
Washington Plunkitt lived many years ago, but most Americans
might well agree that he reflected a common attitude among
modern politicians when he reported as his own modus operandi:
"I seen my opportunities and I took 'em."1° Certainly, the over-
whelming majority of Americans do not trust government, see it
as inefficient, and attribute the inefficiency to the moral turpi-
tude of government functionaries"-even if those functionaries
alist Papers are replete with references to this notion. Indeed, Grover Cleveland's original
quotation is but a close paraphrase of Madison in Federalist No. 46: "The Federal and
State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people...." THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For additional
references, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 316 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing legislators as public trustees and confidential guardians of
the people); THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 344 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("solemn trust"); THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("public trust"); and THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("guardianship" and "trust").
6. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02.05 (3d ed.
1993); see id. §§ 53.02.05 to .02.10 (discussing sovereign immunity).
7. For two comparatively recent and thoughtful articles discussing the application of
fiduciary standards to government, see generally Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough
Ethics in Government Yet? An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57
(1996), and David M. Lawrence, Local Government Officials As Fiduciaries: The Appropri-
ate Standard, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1993).
. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 7, at 61-63, 68, 100-01 (noting the lack of, and need
for, a common standard behind increasingly complex government ethics legislation).
9. Id. at 73.
10. Corey Kilgannon, When Clubs Were Trumps, They Cut Deals While They Stacked
the Deck, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 17, 1999, § 14, at 14.
11. See Karlyn Bowman, Trust in Government, ROLL CALL, Dec. 17, 1998, at 2 (citing
results of a recent poll).
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are not bold enough to admit their attitudes as openly as did
Senator Plunkitt.
There are several potential objections to applying fiduciary
standards to higher government functionaries. 2 One of the most
important is the claim that it simply is not feasible. This paper
addresses that objection by exploring a case that proved it feasi-
ble: the government of the Roman Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98-117).
Indeed, Trajan's example induces us to ask the following ques-
tion: If fiduciary government was practicable in a narrowly based
regime governing a multicultural empire-where communication
was slow and information expensive-why is it not achievable in
America today?' 3
II. PRIVATE AND CIVIL GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS
IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
A. The Standards Regulating Private Governments
Civil government is not, of course, the only institution by which
some citizens manage the property and regulate the conduct of
others. The private sector contains other such arrangements.
Most of us have several such entities in our own lives or in those
of our families: an informal recreational or service club, a guardi-
anship, the entity for which we work, the businesses in which we
invest, the homeowners' association that administers our neigh-
borhood, the church or synagogue we attend, and, for the fortu-
nate among us, the trust that sends us our monthly check. These
institutions differ in their goals and organizational forms. They
also differ in the degree of practical power the managers have
over the managed-or, looking at it from the opposite perspective,
the degree to which the managed depend on, or are vulnerable to,
the managers.
For example, I am a member of a community service club. The
officers of the club have relatively little power over me, and my
practical dependency on them is relatively slight. I have almost
12. See infra text accompanying note 43.
13. It should be made clear at this point that arguments for fiduciary standards in
government do not address the issues of how government decision makers should be se-
lected or what should be the substantive scope of their powers.
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no financial resources invested in the club, I have an important
say in the election of the managing board, and I-or any mem-
ber-only have to write a letter in order to quit.
Until recently, I was a stockholder in Merck & Company, a
leading pharmaceutical firm. The officers of that firm had some-
what more power over me because I had invested several thou-
sand dollars in the company. However, that stock was readily
salable and was not a major portion of my assets, so the officers'
practical influence was not much greater than that of the officers
of the service club.
When I owned a condominium apartment, the board of direc-
tors had a good deal more practical power over me than did the
board of Merck. At the time, my condominium was my principal
economic asset, and because I lived there, the board also con-
trolled much of my noneconomic life. Selling the unit, a decision I
ultimately made, consumed much time and effort. I could vote, or
not, for candidates for each seat on the board every three years,
but that right was of little practical value day-to-day.
My children are the beneficiaries of trusts established by their
grandparents. My children are underage, concomitantly unso-
phisticated, have no way of exiting the trust, and have no role in
selecting the trustees, who currently control much of their poten-
tial inheritance. The practical dependence of my children on the
trustees is greater than the power that the officials of my club or
of Merck could exercise over me.
Dependence invites abuse. The courts respond by protecting
the managed with judicial review of decisions made by the man-
agers. As a general rule, the standards imposed on managers rise
with the degree of likely dependence and vulnerability. 4 This is
only a general rule because locating any particular entity on a
spectrum of dependence is chancy; there are too many variables
among organizations and people. Although the officials of my
service club have little hold over me, in some communities similar
officials wield a great deal of practical economic and social power
14. There are factors other than dependence and vulnerability at play as well, such as
the complexity of the organization, the number of principals, and the risks the organiza-
tion undergoes. See Lawrence, supra note 7, at 8-11 (describing the general nature and
purpose of a corporate enterprise). Inherent in the text, of course, is the well-recognized
conclusion that "fiduciaries" are not all of one stripe. For a summary of the points of dis-
tinction, see Clark, supra note 7, at 69-73.
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over their members. Depending on the person and the commu-
nity, the practical power of church officials might be very great or
very slight. Setting aside the special cases of church governance, 5
the spectrum from nondependence to dependence-with concomi-
tantly rising standards-runs through the following classes:
Least dependent: The classic arms-length transaction.
Slightly dependent: The relationship between the promoter and
the customer considering entering into a more lasting arrange-
ment with the promoter. Examples include the relationship be-
tween corporate promoter and prospective shareholder and the
relationship between land developer and prospective lot buyer.
Somewhat dependent: The relationship between officials of a
large, publicly traded for-profit corporation and the shareholders.
Moderately dependent: Various common enterprises in which
the manager and the managed each have interests in the success
of the enterprise. Examples include (1) the general partnership or
joint venture, (2) the relationship between the subdivision devel-
oper who retains the power to alter real estate covenants and
those who already have purchased lots, (3) the relationship be-
tween the holder of the executive right to lease for oil and gas and
the landowner, 6 (4) the relationship between oil and gas lessee
and landowner, 7 and (5) the relationship between mortgage par-
ticipation lead lender and participants.'"
Very dependent: In this category are various associations in-
volved in the long-term management of important assets for their
members. Examples include property owners' associations cre-
ated by land covenants and housing, fishing, and agricultural co-
operatives.
15. The courts avoid the "excessive entanglement" with religion by generally abstain-
ing from certain intrachurch issues. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is the overriding interest in keeping the government-
whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the business of evaluating the relative
merits of differing religious claims."); cf Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971)
(holding that some form of religious entanglement is necessary but should not be exces-
sive).
16. See, e.g., 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 15.7, at
448-49 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 2001) (discussing the nature and duty owed by each of these
parties).
17. The latter relationship is governed by various "implied covenants." See RICHARD
W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 410-13 (2d ed. 1983).
18. E.g., First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510, 514 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to impose fiduciary duty on lead lender in absense of
contractual requirement); see also GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW 389-99 (3d ed. 1994).
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Extremely dependent: The private family trust and certain
analogous relationships, such as guardianships and management
of controlling interests in close family corporations. 9
Illustrative of the differences in the standards applied as one
moves up the spectrum is the courts' application of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. There is, of course, no such duty in the arms-
length relationship and little, if any, from a promoter to a cus-
tomer, even if the promoter sometimes is misleadingly called a fi-
duciary.2 ° Within the intermediate categories, the duty is
stronger, but because the manager is also one of the managed, he
legitimately may consider his own interests as part of the whole.'
19. For a discussion of the differences in the levels of vulnerability/dependence be-
tween a trust and a corporation, see Lawrence, supra note 7, at 11-12, 23-24, 30.
20. The courts sometimes have labeled this a "fiduciary" relationship, but the pro-
moter's duties actually are quite limited. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 454-60 (1989) (discussing the law of promoter liability).
21. Oil and gas ventures: See generally 5 KUNTZ, supra note 16, § 54.1-.2, at 1-7; id. §
59.1, at 105-118 (discussing intermediate standard of care, and noting that complete fidu-
ciary subordination is not realistic in this setting); see also 1 KUNTZ, supra note 16, § 15.7,
at 449 (noting the occasional use of the term "fiduciary" to describe the duty of care toward
landowners imposed on the holder of the executive right to lease, and proposing other
terms, such as "utmost fair dealing"); HEINGWAY, supra note 17, at 27-32 (discussing
standards concerning the exercise of power between landowners and those with the power
to lease).
Mortgage participations: See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 512 (5th ed. 1998) (citing First Citizens Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1990)) (declining
to impose a fiduciary duty on lead lender in absence of contractual requirement).
Right of subdivider to alter covenants: The duty is significant, but falls short of fiduci-
ary. See, e.g., Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners' Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1982) (using
a reasonableness standard); Berger v. Van Sweringen Co., 216 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Ohio 1966)
("The company has discretion to act, but it must not abuse that discretion and must exer-
cise its sound judgment in determining that restrictions should be waived, changed or
cancelled."); Lakemore Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Swanson, 600 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979) (applying a reasonableness standard).
Corporations: Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981). In Johnson, the court stated:
It is frequently said that directors are fiduciaries. Although this statement is
true in some senses, it is also obvious that if directors were held to the same
standard as ordinary fiduciaries the corporation could not conduct business.
For example, an ordinary fiduciary may not have the slightest conflict of in-
terest in any transaction he undertakes on behalf of the trust. Yet by the very
nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount of self-interest in eve-
rything he does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate
profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so
that they will not oust him.
The business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem by validating
certain situations that otherwise would involve a conflict of interest for the
ordinary fiduciary.
Id. at 292; cf. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that self-interested dealing is
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In private trusts, however, the duty of loyalty is one of strict sub-
ordination to the interests of the beneficiary.22
The courts apply a similar sliding scale to obligations of care.
In the context of publicly traded for-profit corporations, where
practical dependence is relatively low, courts use a version of the
Business Judgment Rule that protects officials' discretionary de-
cisions from the threat of personal liability, even when the offi-
cials are negligent." In property owners' associations, where de-
pendence often is much higher, the version of the Business
Judgment Rule applied (when it is applied) gives managers a
narrower immunity than that enjoyed by the officers of publicly
traded corporations.24 One may argue that the same is true for
partnerships and close corporations.25 Trustees may not take ad-
vantage of the Business Judgment Rule at all.
permitted in a business corporation if it is fair to the corporation).
Partnerships: See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (b), (e) (amended 1994), 6 U.LA. 58
(1995) (limiting the duty of loyalty); id. § 404 cmt. 5 (amended 1994), 6 U.L.A. 58, 61
(1995) ("A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the same standards as a trus-
tee. Subsection (e) makes clear that a partner's conduct is not deemed to be improper
merely because it serves the partner's own individual interest.").
22. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 541, at 166 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing generally the duties of a trustee); ef
Johnson, 629 F.2d at 292 (stating that a corporate director is not required to subordinate
completely his own personal interests).
23. See NATELSON, supra note 20, at 441-42 (analyzing the standard of care with re-
gard to officials of for-profit corporations).
24. See id. at 441. For example, in Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.,
553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990), the court rejected a reasonableness standard in favor of a
Business Judgment Rule that would seem to insulate cooperative and condominium direc-
tors from ordinary negligence. Id. at 1321-22. However, the court also acknowledged that
in practice the cooperative/condominium rule would evolve differently from the business
corporation context. See id. at 1322. Moreover, the court's standard is still significantly
higher than that used in reviewing legislative decisions. Id. Not only must actions be
within the scope of authority and have a legitimate relationship to the welfare of the coop-
erative, but they may not discriminate against individuals (for example, may not be redis-
tributive) or be taken without notice or consideration of all relevant facts. Id. at 1322-23.
25. Application of the rule itself and the version to be applied are controversial issues
in partnership law. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.02
(1992 & Cum. Supp. 2000) (discussing the duty of care in partnership management); Nor-
wood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
753, 757-58 (1990) (arguing that partners may be subject to a version of the Business
Judgment Rule that requires the exercise of ordinary care). But see UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
404(c) (amended 1994), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995) (stating that a partner's duty in the conduct of a
business wind-up is "limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law").
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B. The Standards Regulating Civil Governments
"The King Can Do No Wrong."
- Maxim of Anglo-American public law."
The power of the most powerful trustee pales in comparison to
the authority wielded by the officials of civil government, espe-
cially those with significant discretionary authority." While the
responsibility of particular government officials vary, even local
legislators and board members routinely engage in regulatory,
tax, and redistributive activity with immense implications for the
lives, livelihoods, and property of citizens. The adoption and im-
plementation of zoning laws represent just one example. Moreo-
ver, both federal and state officials may imprison, seize property,
fine, and inflict capital punishment. Federal officials may make
war and conscript soldiers for war.2"
In the face of such power, the citizen generally has fewer alter-
natives than when dealing with private actors. Exit (emigration)
from even the smallest political jurisdictions ranges from the in-
convenient to the nearly impossible. The average citizen's voice in
selecting government officials is limited to the very top tier: the
legislature, the chief executive(s), and in some states, the judges.
Organization costs of securing the removal of unsatisfactory offi-
cials are high. As both federal and state governments expand
their responsibilities, choosing among candidates becomes less
meaningful because issues increasingly are bundled together. Of
course, the U.S. Constitution's grant of only enumerated powers
to the federal government was designed in part to minimize bun-
dling, but that limit has broken down since New Deal days.29 So
today Presidential candidates have important things to say about
even intensely local issues, such as the class size at your neigh-
borhood public school."0 Thus, the voter often is faced with choices
26. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 53.02.05 to .02.10.
27. Fiduciary-like standards often are applied to non-policy-making public employees.
See Clark, supra note 7, at 74.
28. For recognition of the general point in a local government context, see Lawrence,
supra note 7, at 23-24.
29. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (finding that commerce
clause power includes Congress's power to regulate the price of commodities within that
commerce); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 4.9, at 179-
84 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing expansion of the commerce clause).
30. See, e.g., Jim Bebbington, Gore to Visit Valley, DAYTON DAILYNEWS, Sept. 9,2000,
at 1B (commenting on presidential candidate Al Gore's discussion of "how to create a
2001]
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such as: "Let's see. Do I want Candidate A for President, who has
more foreign policy experience and will increase my farm subsidy,
but take away my son's tax credit and tighten up on my mother's
Medicare-or Candidate B, who will cut my farm subsidy, but in-
crease my son's opportunity to log on local lands, raise my
mother's social security check, and fund smaller classes for my
children?" Obviously, this sort of bundling renders voter choice
much less meaningful than at a time when government, espe-
cially the federal government, dealt only with a handful of issues.
The reality of power and dependence suggests that the stan-
dards of conduct for public officials should at least equal, if not
exceed, those applied to private sector managers."' But, especially
as concerns policymaking officials, this is not the case. The cor-
relation between dependence and the strictness of oversight ends
at the Capitol steps.
Despite ad hoc concessions to individual rights, our public law's
motivating theory is the pre-Independence notion that the sover-
eign can do no wrong. The sovereign is no longer the King but,
theoretically at least, the people. Yet the force of administration
on individual citizens is much the same. Hence, in the usual case
of Government v. Citizen, unless Citizen finds protection in some
enumerated right, ethics rule, or waiver of sovereign power, he is
lost. He has no recourse at law for stupid or negligent acts by
public officials because those officials are immune as agents of
the sovereign; 2 and even if sovereign immunity has been waived,
quality classroom environment, how teachers are trained, creating smaller class sizes and
school modernization"); Jeff Leeds, Campaign 2000: Ad Watch: Democrats' Commercial
Touts Smaller Classes, College Tax Breaks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2000, at A12 (discussing
the Democratic Party's then planned release of a thirty second commercial in which then-
candidate Al Gore would discuss how the hiring of 100,000 additional teachers nationally
could reduce class size).
Although this sort of talk comes from politicians of all stripes, the available evidence is
that, within the range generally applicable in public schools, class size seems to have rela-
tively little impact on educational quality. See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK, THE EVIDENCE ON
CLASS SIZE (1998). Imposing fiduciary standards on public officials would encourage a
higher level of discourse on public policy.
31. See Lawrence, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that local government should be held to
stricter standards applicable to trustees rather than to corporate standards).
32. See 18 MCQUILIN, supra note 6, § 53.02.05 to .02.10 (discussing that sovereign
immunity is based on the maxim, 'The king can do no wrong."); see also Collins v. Tabet,
806 P.2d 40, 44 (N.M. 1991) (holding that a court-appointed guardian ad litem is abso-
lutely immune from liability for work done on behalf of a court, but is liable if operating as
a private fiduciary).
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recovery may be limited."3 The government may adversely possess
the citizen's land, but the citizen cannot, in turn, adversely pos-
sess against the government.3 4 He may be subject to estoppel, but
the government often cannot be. 5 If he grants land to a private
party, the deed is construed against him, but if government
grants land to him, the deed is construed in favor of the govern-
ment. 6 Courts tightly regulate the citizen's power to seize assets
ex parte, but the government has more latitude.3 " If the govern-
ment regulates the citizen's land so as to diminish its value, he
has no recourse unless all economically viable use has been wiped
out.3" The citizen's private association cannot engage in re-
distributive activity, but the government does so incessantly. Un-
like private sector employees, public sector employees may be de-
nied the right to strike.3 9 The federal government is said to be a
"trustee" for the American Indians, but ultimately, those trust
duties are unenforceable against the federal government.4" The
private fiduciary must be prepared to justify his decisions by
showing reasonable investigation and disinterested analysis; if he
cannot, he may see his decisions invalidated and be subject to li-
ability. Yet outside a few instances in which the courts apply
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5) (West 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2000) (imposing
limits of $100,000 and $200,000 respectively and no punitive damages or prejudgment in-
terest). For a discussion of the problems of sovereign immunity, including damage limita-
tions, in a currently contentious setting, see generally Tracy B. Harding, Chalk Talk: Fa-
tal School Shootings, Liability, and Sovereign Immunity: Where Should the Line Be
Drawn?, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 162 (2001).
34. Because nullum tempus occurit regi (no time runs against the king). 16 RICHARD
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.11[1] (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1999) (citing
Devins v. Borough of Bogata, 592 A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1991)); 4 HERBERT THORNDIKE
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1170 (3d ed. 1975).
35. See 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 20.13 ("Generally, estoppel will not be applied to
prevent or to hinder the exercise of governmental functions.").
36. ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY 97 (1992).
37. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (1994) (pertaining to ex parte forfeitures); Civil As-
set Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 985(d)(1)(B)(ii), 114 Stat. 202,
215 (2000) (considering ex parte forfeitures under the title for crimes and criminal proce-
dure).
38. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); 11 POWELL, supra
note 34, § 79.03[2] (discussing riparian rights and land use regulation); see also City of
Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999) (holding that
the issue of whether a landowner has been deprived of all economic value is a question of
fact).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 2000).
40. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 222 (1982 ed.) (stating
that Congress can abrogate treaties with Indians unilaterally even to the point of ending
the trust relationship); see also Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903).
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"strict scrutiny" or "intermediate scrutiny,"41 government officials
may proceed on slender or no empirical basis and in circum-
stances of clear conflict of interest, and the courts will sustain the
decisions and protect from liability those who made them.42
The extraordinary latitude granted government officials is de-
fended on various grounds. A few of these are reviewed later in
this article. Our principal focus here is the argument that stricter
public norms are not feasible-that the nature of public responsi-
bility is such that public employees cannot reasonably be held to
the sort of standards applied to everyone else. For example, it is
said that governments should be exempt from adverse possession
because (1) the government has a lot of land, which often is va-
cant and hard to police, (2) government employees are often neg-
ligent, (3) other citizens should not be deprived of land because of
that negligence, and (4) public policy is served by government
ownership of land.43 Of course, none of this explains why govern-
ment should be permitted to hold tracts of land so large it cannot
manage them, why negligence is so casually accepted among
public employees, or why the negligent actors or their insurers
should not be responsible for loss rather than the taxpayer or the
good faith adverse possessor.
The best answer to the unfeasibility claim, however, is to show
by historical example that fiduciary government is feasible-and
not merely among the bureaucrats, who are subject to daily re-
view from above, but among policymakers themselves. The gov-
ernment conducted by the Roman Emperor Trajan is one histori-
cal example.
41. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (explaining that strict
scrutiny, applied to race-based classifications, requires a narrowly tailored measure fur-
thering a compelling state interest; and that intermediate scrutiny, applied to gender-
based classification, means substantially related to an important governmental objective).
Protection of economic expectancies or freedom of contract, however, is deemed to be nei-
ther "compelling" nor "important."
42. See, for example, NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 14.3 on the rational rela-
tionship test:
The Court will not grant any significant review of legislative decisions to
classify persons in terms of general economic... legislation.... Thus, if a
classification is of this type the court will ask only whether it is conceivable
that the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of government
which is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as it is arguable that the
other branch of government had such a basis for creating the classification a
court should not invalidate the law.
Id. § 14.3, at 639; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84 (describing the various levels of
judicial review applied to statutes that allegedly discriminate).
43. 16 POWELL, supra note 34, § 91.11[1].
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III. THE EMPEROR TRAJAN
A. Biography
Trajan-Marcus Ulpius Trajanus-was one of the most ad-
mired Roman emperors. He was born in the Spanish-Roman town
of Italica, near modern Seville, then part of the Province of Bae-
tica: the first emperor born outside Italy.
The year of his birth is usually given as A.D. 53, but there is
good evidence for the year 56." Nothing is known of his mother;
however, some speculate that she was a member of the Celtibe-
rian aristocracy.45 His father, also named Marcus Ulpius Traja-
nus, was later to become governor of Baetica. Trajan's father also
served as commander of the Legion X Fretensis in Judaea (A.D.
68-70) under the' general supervision of the future emperors
Vespasian and Titus, as consul (A.D. 70; the first of his family to
attain that office), as proconsul of the province of Asia, and as
imperial governor of Syria.'
Trajan, the son, pursued a military career from the start." He
spent an unusually long time as a young military tribune-some
evidence suggests as long as ten years, but this is improbable.
During part of this period, he worked with his father, when the
latter was governor of Syria, on the frontier fortifications. Trajan
also passed through the normal civilian offices, serving as praetor
in 85 and consul in 91. Between those two dates he commanded a
legion stationed in Spain. While specific combat experience can-
not be identified, we know that Trajan was a well-regarded and
broadly experienced military officer.
In 96, following the assassination of the Emperor Domitian, the
senate elected Marcus Cocceius Nerva as princeps48 or emperor.
44. JULIAN BENNETT, TRAJAN: OPTIMUS PRINCEPS 13 (1997); DIO, supra note 1, at
68.15.6.
45. BENNETr, supra note 44, at 11.
46. On Trajanus the Elder, see id. at 11-19. Trajanus was a consul suffectus, which
means he was a replacement consul who took office later in the year rather than the more
honored consul ordinarius, two of whom took office on January 1 and for whom the year
was thereafter designated.
47. The following discussion of Trajan's life is taken from BENNET, supra note 44, at
11-26; R.P. Longden, Nerva and Trajan, in 11 CAMiBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY 188, 199-222
(1995); ALBINO GARZETI, FROM TIBERIUS TO THE ANTONINES 308-73 (1974); and BERNARD
HENDERSON, FIvE ROMAN EMPERORS 174-207 (1927).
48. Princeps was an old civilian title originally given to the chairman of the Roman
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To quell unrest in the legions, in 97 Nerva adopted Trajan as his
heir, probably because Trajan recently had won some military or
diplomatic distinction as governor of Pannonia (near modern Slo-
venia).49 Shortly thereafter, Trajan was transferred to the com-
mand of the armies in Lower (northern) Germany. When Nerva
died in January 98, Trajan succeeded him.
By temperament and background, Trajan would have been ex-
pected to be primarily a military figure rather than a jurist. He
is, in fact, celebrated for his military achievements. Much of his
life was spent on shoring up the empire's frontiers, especially, but
not exclusively,50 in the Northeast.51 In addition to Trajan's labor
senate. It sometimes is translated "first citizen" and is, of course, the basis of our English
word "prince." From the beginning, emperors were always known as principes.
Imperial nomenclature also included Imperator, meaning "commander," a military ti-
tle. Each emperor further took as family names Caesar and Augustus-the latter meaning,
approximately, "revered" or "honored one."
Trajan's full name on accession was Imperator Caesar Divi Nervae Filius Nerva Traia-
nus Augustus (Commander Caesar, son of the deified Nerva, Nerva Trajan Augustus).
Emperors tended to accumulate additional titles as their reigns progressed, and Trajan
was no exception. Later in his reign, the senate awarded him several additional names,
including Dacicus (conqueror of the Dacians), Parthicus (conqueror of the Parthians), and,
most famously, Optimus (best).
49. BENNETt, supra note 44, at 45-46. Although it has long been assumed that Trajan
was in Germany when Nerva adopted him, Julian Bennett makes a strong case that he
was the source of certain military laurels sent from Pannonia. See id.
50. On Trajan's little-known frontier work in Africa, where he was, however, not pres-
ent, see Longden, supra note 47, at 223. His most important border adjustment outside
the Northeast occurred when one of his lieutenants peacefully annexed the Nabataean
Arab kingdom, which extended from modern Jordan southeast well into Saudi Arabia. See
EUT., supra note 1, at 8.3.2; see also G.W. BoWERSOCK, ROMAN ARABIA 81-85 (1983); G.W.
Bowersock, A Report on Arabia Provincia, 61 J. ROMAN STUD. 219 (1971).
He also did work in Germany, but this seems to have been largely preparatory of fu-
ture northeastern campaigns. Longden, supra note 47, at 225.
51. Trajan's focus on the northeast quadrant of the empire was civil as well as mili-
tary and is a feature of his reign worth further examination. In addition to the military
work mentioned in the text, he made major changes in the administration of the northeast
quadrant after the Second Dacian War: Pannonia was divided into upper and lower prov-
inces; the procurator in Thrace was replaced by an imperial governor; the border between
the provinces of Asia and Bithynia was adjusted; and the administration of Galatia and
Cappadocia was separated. GARZETTI, supra note 47, at 345.
The northeastern focus shows up in Trajan's surviving juristic work. Of the eight
known recipients of Trajan's rescripts (replies to provincial governors), two are otherwise
unknown but five have been identified as imperial governors of northeast provinces. The
first was Statilius Severus, Thrace, in A.D. 111-12. DIG. 29.1.24; J. INST. 2.11.1. The sec-
ond was L. Minicius Natalis, Pannonia, in 116-17. See FERGUS MILLAR, THE EMPEROR IN
THE ROMAN WORLD (1977); SIR RONALD SYME, TACITUS 243 (1958); Sir Ronald Syme, The
Jurist Neratius Priscus, 85 HERMES 480, 493 (1957). The third was "lulius Fronto"-likely
P. Calvisius Ruso Iulius Frontinus, Cappadocia, in 105-07. See SYME, supra, at 793; cf
MILLAR, supra, at 324. The fourth was Minicius Natalis, Pannonia. See MILLAR, supra, at
324. The fifth was Gaius Plinius, Bithynia-Pontus, c. 109-11, see infra. For an article ex-
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in Syria for his father, he worked on boundaries all along the Da-
nube and conquered the trans-Danubian country of Dacia-mod-
ern Romania.52 As a result of a dispute regarding Armenia, also
in the Northeast, he fought an initially successful, but ultimately
futile, war with Parthia. He died in 117 with that task unfin-
ished.
Despite Trajan's military accomplishments, the ancients con-
sidered his domestic contributions to be at least as significant.53
In general, Trajan tried to be a ruler in the relatively mild tradi-
tion of Augustus and Nerva rather than a despot like Nero or
Domitian.54 As we shall see, he cultivated the image of the parens
patriae, the Father of His Country, who labored unceasingly for
his people and thought only of their welfare: the ruler as fiduci-
ary.
B. Trajan Arrives in American Legal Writing
Despite America's common law tradition, both our culture and
our legal system owe much to Rome, whose gifts have been
transmitted to us through the office of the intervening years. The
image of Trajan as the selfless, ideal ruler arose during his own
plaining Trajan's interest in Bithynia-Pontus, but advancing reasons applicable to most of
the northeast quadrant, see Barbara Levick, Pliny in Bithynia-And What Followed, 26
GREECE & RoME 119 (1979).
52. Trajan's conquest is why Romania is today an island of Latinate speech in a Slavic
sea.
53. See, e.g., EUT., supra note 1, at 8.2.1 ("Rem publicam ita administravit, ut omni-
bus principibus merito praeferatur-"He so governed the state as to exceed all [other] em-
perors in merit."); id. at 8.4.1 ("Gloriam tamen militarem civilitate et moderatione supera-
vit"-"He exceeded however his military glory by the quality of his civil government and
his self-restraint."); see also EPrr., supra note 1, at 13.9 (describing Trajan as author and
preserver of 'justice and human and divine law").
54. In this century, in counterreaction to the excessive panegyric that always has sur-
rounded Trajan, some scholars have sought a sinister side in his reign. A very great Eng-
lish Roman historian, Sir Ronald Syme, certainly participated in this effort. See, e.g.,
SYME, supra note 51 (which is his monumental work on the subject). Predictably, others
even looked harder and purported to find more. See, e.g., KH. Waters, Traianus Domitiani
Continuator, 90 AM1. J. PHIL. 385 (1969); Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition, in
POLiS AND IMPERIEJM: STUDIEs IN HONOR OF EDWARD TOGO SALMON (1974).
This revisionism clearly went too far. As R.P. Longden observed in his article in the
Cambridge Ancient History, 'Trajan was popular in his lifetime and his memory remained
green, and that in an age which, like Tacitus' own, is infensa virtutibus [hostile to personal
excellence] is hard to forgive.. . . " Longden, supra note 47, at 201.
To his credit, Professor Bennett steered a moderate course in his recent biography. See
generally BENNETr, supra note 44.
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reign but gained force during those intervening years. In the
third century after Trajan's death, the senate acclaimed new em-
perors with the hope that they would be "more fortunate than
Augustus, better than Trajan."55 Later the story arose-reported
in Dante's Divine Comedy-that after hearing of one of Trajan's
acts of kindness the Pope successfully prayed for the emperor's
salvation. Thus, papal petition and divine grace bestowed upon
Trajan alone, of all pagans born after Christ, a place among the
blessed.56
Then the luster of reputation shone into the modern era. Tra-
jan is celebrated as a founder of two modern civil rights: the right
not to be convicted in absentia in a criminal case,57 and a criminal
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, with its
concomitant ban on anonymous accusations.58 Courts and legal
55. See, e.g., EUT., supra note 1, at 8.1.5.3 ("FeliciorAugusto, melior Traino").
Trajan was a model for fourth-century emperors in a number of ways, including his ef-
fort to annex territory in the East. See, e.g., C.S. Lightfoot, Trajan's Parthian War and the
Fourth-Century Perspective, 80 J. ROMAN STUD. 114, 212 (1990).
56. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE PURGATORIO, Canto 10:70-90 (John Chiardi trans.,
1957); see also DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE PARADISO, Canto 20:43-48, 103-17 (John Chiardi
trans., 1961). For references in legal literature, see Michael E. Smith, Punishment in the
Divine Comedy, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 533, 537 (1994); Carl Landauer, Mosaic Imaginings:
French Art and Its Revolutions, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 433, 444 (1995) (book review).
57. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (citing Trajan's rescript that
one should not be convicted of crime in his absence); Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M.
Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause,
34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 547 (1994) (discussing Trajan's ruling on not convicting persons in
absentia as part of the history of the confrontation doctrine).
58. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 367 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing ban on anony-
mous accusations); Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43, 49 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (citing
Trajan's ban on anonymous accusations), vacated by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973); State v. Dennison, 406 S.E.2d 383, 385 (S.C. 1991) (citing Trajan's prohibition
of anonymous accusations against suspected Christians as part of a review of the history
of the right to confront witnesses against one), overruled by German v. State, 478 S.E.2d
687 (S.C. 1996).
Among law review articles mentioning the subject are the following- Jeremy A. Blu-
menthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in
Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157, 1176 (1993) (commenting on Trajan's
rejection of anonymous accusations, correspondence, and the history of the confrontation
clause); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV.
193, 280 (1956) (quoting Justice Blacks dissenting opinion in Jay v. Boyd on confronta-
tion and the Pliny-Trajan correspondence); Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or
'Summary" Justice? The Alien Terrorist Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 TuLsA J. ComF. & INT'L L. 143, 143 (1996) (quoting
Trajan's rescript against anonymous accusations); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of
Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 918 (1988); Alexander M. Sanders,
Jr., Newgarth Revisited. Mrs. Robinson's Case, 49 S.C. L. REV. 407, 438 (1998) (discussing
the right of confrontation and Trajan's proscription against anonymous accusations); Jac-
queline Miller Beckett, Note, The True Value of the Confrontation Clause: A Study of Child
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scholars also cite Trajan for his statement that in a criminal case,
"satius enim esse, impunitum relinqui facinus nocentis, quam in-
nocentem damnari'--"for it is better that one guilty of crime be
unpunished than that an innocent person be condemned."59
Thus, in the 1930s, Trajan was enshrined in a bas-relief in the
U.S. Supreme Court as a veritable symbol of equal justice under
law.60
Besides this recognition, American legal writers occasionally
refer to Trajan in discussions of law and religion because the pro-
hibition on anonymous accusations appeared in a famous rescript
on prosecution of Christians.6' However, American legal sources
Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEo. L.J. 1605, 1609 (1994) (commenting on Trajan's rejection of
anonymous accusations, correspondence, and the history of confrontation clause);
Cathleen J. Cinella, Note, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation-
United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 135, 139 (1998) (discussing the right of
confrontation and Trajan's proscription against anonymous accusations); John A. Mayers,
Note, Coy v. Iowa: A Constitutional Right of Intimidation, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 709, 713
(1989) (commenting on Trajan's rejection of anonymous accusations, correspondence, and
the history of the confrontation clause); Karen L. Tomlinson, Note, Maryland v. Craig:
Televised Testimony and an Evolving Concept of Confrontation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1569,
1610 (1991) (commenting on Trajan's rejection of anonymous accusations, correspondence,
and the history of the confrontation clause).
59. The quotation is from Justinian's Digest:
Absentem in criminibus damnari non debere, divus Traianus Iulio Fron-
toni rescripsit. Sed nec de suspicionibus debere aliquem damnari, divus
Traianus Adsiduo Severo rescripsit; satius enim esse, impunitum relinqui
facinus nocentis, quam innocentem damnari.
This may be translated:
An absent person should not be condemned in a criminal proceeding, the
deified Trajan wrote in a rescript to Julius Fronto. But neither should one be
condemned on mere suspicion, the deified Trajan wrote to Adsiduus Severus
in a rescript; for it is better that one guilty of crime be unpunished than that
an innocent person be condemned.
DIG. 48.19.5pr; see Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454; Alexander Volokh, Aside: n Guilty Men, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 173, 178 (1997).
60. For this and other incidents, see BENNETt, supra note 44, at xvi-xvii.
61. Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 56 (Md. 1966); Ecker v.
First Natl Bank, 1 A. 849, 851 (Md. 1885) (citing Pliny's letter on the Christians regarding
the effects of Sunday laws); Wright v. Dressell, 3 N.E. 6, 8 (Mass. 1885); St. Nicholas Ca-
thedral v. Kedroff, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453, 480 (App. Div. 1950) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting)
(noting that Trajan persecuted Christians), rev'd, 96 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1950), motion
granted, 98 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Sparhawk v. Union Passen-
ger Ry. Co., 54 Pa. 401, 429, 438 (1867) (citing Pliny's letter on the Christians regarding
the effects of Sunday laws); Bolling v. Superior Court, 133 P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. 1943)
(showing the importance of religious gestures from Pliny's letter on the Christians);
Raines v. Watson, 2 W.Va. 371, 388 (1868) (citing Pliny's letter on the Christians regard-
ing the effects of Sunday laws); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Commen-
tary: Religious Expression and Teacher Control of the Classroom: A New Battleground for
Free Speech, 107 EDUC. LAW REP. 1, 14 (1996) (citing the correspondence between Pliny
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generally have neglected other aspects of Trajan's juristic rec-
ord, 2 especially its most important theme: the ruler as fiduciary.
C. Sources for Trajan's Reign
Before examining the substance of Trajan's record, it is appro-
priate to say something of the nature of Roman sources, with
which the general reader may be unfamiliar.6 3
The dry sands of Egypt and the diligence of Medieval copyists
have left to us a considerable body of literature from the time of
the Roman Empire. Unfortunately, the sources on Trajan are less
plentiful than for most other emperors of the first and second cen-
turies. For example, the famous compilation of imperial biogra-
phies by Suetonius Tranquillus ends two years before Trajan's ac-
cession. The less reliable imperial biographies in the pseudo-
nymonous Historia Augusta do not begin until Trajan's death.
The greatest of Roman historians, Tacitus, wrote during Trajan's
reign, but he did not write, overtly at least, about Trajan. Dio
Cassius (c. A.D. 200), a Roman senator who wrote in Greek, ex-
amined Trajan's times in his Roman History, but the relevant
chapter survives only in the form of a Byzantine abridgment or
"epitome."
In addition to this epitome, the available literary sources on
Trajan include the Panegyricus, a speech in praise of the emperor
and Trajan as a secondary source verifying existence of Jesus).
62. But see Bloom v. Georgia, 20 Ga. 443, 449 (1856) (citing Trajan's letter on fire bri-
gades as part of the history of corporations); John Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy: An
Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 595-96 (1999)
(using the same correspondence to show how a power can control other nations through
law); Barbara A. Hauser, Death Duties and Immortality: Why Civilization Needs Inheri-
tances, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 363, 367 (1999) (reciting Trajan's reduction of in-
heritance taxes in a larger history of death taxes); Joyce Ann Mercer, Legal and Theologi-
cal Justice for Abused Adolescent Girls, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 451, 469 (1992) (discussion of
Pliny-Trajan correspondence as part of history of abandoned children); Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, Essay on the Bill of Rights: Exporting the American Bill of Rights: Lessons from
Romania, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (observing that the Romans colonized Romania
under Trajan).
Sometimes Trajan gets credit for doctrines for which he was not responsible. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Stephens & Cagger, 26 Wend. 451, 454 (N.Y. 1851) (discussing putative Trajanic
law on attorneys' fees); Attorney General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 597 (1855) (inaccurately
crediting Trajan with origin of division of powers).
63. The discussion which follows refers generally to each of the sources cited, supra
note 1.
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published by the consul, Pliny the Younger, in A.D. 100;64 Pliny's
personal correspondence with and about Trajan;65 some short
fourth century biographies of the emperor; and bits and pieces of
other writings, including the Historia Augusta's biography of
Hadrian (Trajan's cousin and successor) and comments by the
late second century philosopher/rhetorician Fronto.
Most of these sources include useful information about Trajan's
legal product, especially Pliny's Panegyricus and Pliny's corre-
spondence with and about Trajan. Pliny did, after all, serve Tra-
jan in several legal capacities, including assessor (advisor at trial)
and imperial governor. Just as important are Trajan's surviving
decisions set forth in the Corpus Juris, the great sixth century
compilation of Roman law assembled by order of the Emperor
Justinian.
By far the largest part of the Corpus Juris is the Digest, which
looks rather like an American case digest, except that it contains
fragments of juristic writings rather than the holdings of cases.
About two dozen of these fragments describe rulings by Trajan.
Another part of the Corpus Juris is an elementary law textbook-
perhaps the most influential law book ever written-Justinian's
Institutes, which contains three of Trajan's rulings. Also in the
Corpus is the Codex, a collection of later imperial decrees that re-
fer to two decrees issued earlier by Trajan.
To the foregoing, we must add stray fragments of Trajanic law
contained in the Institutes of Gaius, a second century jurist on
which Justinian's Institutes is based, and in occasional inscrip-
tions and legends on coins.
Trajan's decisions, wherever found, come in several forms: (1)
court decrees in which the emperor was serving as judge, (2) im-
perial mandata-that is, initial instructions to provincial gover-
nors, (3) rescripts, such as Trajan's replies to Pliny-imperial let-
ters in reply to official inquiries, usually from provincial
64. Although some have dismissed the Panegyric as merely windy adulation, its struc-
ture and purpose enhance its credibility as a factual source. See generally BENNETT, supra
note 44, at 63-66; Mark P.O. Morford, Iubes Esse Liberos: Pliny's Panegyricus and Liberty,
113 Ai. J. PHIL. 113 (1992); Betty Radice, Pliny and the Panegyricus, 15 GREECE AND
RohIE 166, 168 (1968) ("This, then, is no idle flattery in conventional form; it is rather a
sort of manifesto of the senate's ideal of a constitutional ruler....").
65. See A.N. Sherwin-White, Trajan's Replies to Pliny: Authorship and Necessity, 52 J.
ROIAN STUD. 114 (1962).
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governors, (4) other official letters, (5) edicts issued under the ex
ante praetorian (judicial) power, (6) decrees of the senate, which
were either initiated by the emperor or otherwise had imperial
sanction, and (7) other constitutiones ("decisions") the exact na-
ture of which is uncertain, but which may have been issued in re-
scripts.6 6
Over the last few decades we have been able to glean more in-
formation from archeological finds and inscriptions (such as out-
posts in Trajan's province of Arabia),67 legends on coins, and the
fruits of detective work of the kind done by the late Oxford
scholar Sir Ronald Syme and his disciples.
Because of the lack of traditional sources, modern scholars
have written less on Trajan than on emperors such as Augustus
or Nero, for whom more information is available. Indeed, until re-
cently, the only full, modern biographical treatment of Trajan
available in any language was Roberto Paribeni's Optimus Prin-
ceps," published in Italy in 1926. As the time and place of publi-
cation might suggest, Paribeni wrote his book from a Fascist
viewpoint. Thus, readers interested in more dispassionate treat-
ments had to rely on chapters in larger works.6 9
In 1997, however, Julian Bennett, an English scholar, pub-
lished the biography Trajan: Optimus Princeps7 The same year
another English scholar, Anthony Birley, issued his biography of
Trajan's kinsman and successor, Hadrian." Professor Bennett's
book especially is an important step toward understanding our
subject, and his work has helped make this article possible.
66. See generally Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory
Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 45, 51 (1994) (discussing the role of imperial
constitutiones, and giving the Trajan-Pliny correspondence as an example).
67. For example, as a result of new finds, we know that the Province of Arabia, an-
nexed by Trajan, was more extensive than formerly believed. Bowersock, supra note 50, at
230.
68. ROBERTO PARIBENI, OPTIMUS PRINCEPS: SAGGIO SULLA STORIA E SUI TEMPI
DELL'IMPERATORE TRAiANO (Arno Press 1975) (1926).
69. Sections on Trajan appear in Longden, supra note 47, at 188-252; GARZET1i, su-
pra note 47 at 308-73; HENDERSON, supra note 47 passim.
70. BENNETT, supra note 44.
71. ANTHONYR. BIRLEY, HADRIAN: THE RESTLESS EMPEROR (1997).
GOVERNMENT AS FIDUCIARY
IV. TRAJAN'S APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
The theme of Part IV is that Trajan implemented what we
would today think of as a fiduciary concept of government. I am
using the term fiduciary in the sense applied to trusts, coopera-
tive associations, and other entities found near the dependence
end of the spectrum.72
I've structured this Part around four central trust obligations:
(1) the duty to follow instructions, (2) the duty of loyalty, (3) the
duty of impartiality, and (4) the duty of reasonable care. The dis-
cussion of loyalty and care include certain subsidiary obligations,
such as the duty to avoid conflict of interest, the duty to prevent
commingling of accounts, and the duty to exercise care in select-
ing and supervising agents.
B. The Duty to Follow Instructions
"Non est princeps super leges sed leges super principem. .
("The emperor is not above the laws, but the laws are above the
emperor.")
-Pliny the Younger, on Trajan's ruling philosophy.73
A trustee has the duty to follow the directions of the settlor as
expressed in the terms of the trust.74 The most important ana-
logue in public service is that officials follow preexisting law until
the law is changed in accordance with preexisting procedures.
Today, we tend to think of observing preexisting law as a
minimal requirement for public service, although as noted below,
significant lapses do occur.75 The Romans had come to expect less
from their rulers, especially as the principate became more
openly absolutist. There was little of the rule of law throughout
much of the personal autocracy of Caligula, Nero, and Domitian.76
72. Supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
73. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 65.1.
74. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 161.
75. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
76. SUET., supra note 1, Gaius Caligula 22.1-42, Nero 26.1-30.3, 32.1-38.3, Domitian
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Because Trajan's power was very nearly absolute, his exacting
adherence to law and legal norms is significant. Soon after his ac-
cession, he indicated that his would be a law-abiding reign by
taking several oaths to that effect. He swore not to inflict capital
punishment or disenfranchisement on any member of the senato-
rial order." When he took the oath as consul in A.D. 100, he sur-
prised all his listeners"8 by stating that the law was above the
princeps rather than the princeps above the law.79
Although some have tried to explain away the significance of
the latter statement, ° I have been unable to find any reported
case in which Trajan simply disregarded established rules or
precedents."' For one thing, throughout the nearly twenty years
of his reign he never violated his promise not to disenfranchise or
kill senators.8 2 In summarizing this aspect of Trajan's rule, Pro-
fessor Bennett states:
Trajan's personal attitude to legal matters [was] that the letter of
the law was supreme, but the spirit of humane justice should pre-
vail.... [He] was ... blunt and uncompromising concerning the mat-
ter of the law, but emphasized magnanimity where possible.
8 3
There certainly are instances that showed Trajan to be blunt
and uncompromising.84 Occasionally he softened the fall force of
the law-his abstaining from vigorous prosecution of Christians
is a good example-but always in cases when policy or humanity
suggested that course.8"
10.1-14.1, 15.1.
77. DIO, supra note 1, at 68.5.2; see also id. at 68.15.
78. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 64.
79. Id. at 65.1.
80. See, e.g., Morford, supra note 64. The ideal of the emperor voluntarily following
the law continued into more oppressive reigns as well. Thus, the military despot Septimius
Severus (reigned A.D. 193-211) averred for himself and his savage son Caracalla: "For al-
though we are not bound by the laws nevertheless we live in accordance with the laws." J.
INST. 2.17 ("Licet enim legibus soluti sumus, attamen legibus vivimus.").
81. On Trajan's attitude towards the law, see PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 34.2, 36.2, 77.
82. There is no record of Trajan imposing the death penalty on a member of that or-
der. His most severe penalty was exile to an island. See, e.g., PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.31.
83. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 123.
84. E.g., PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.31 (discussing the case of the adulterous wife and
the centurion).
85. Id. at 10.97 (stating that the imperial governor was not to hunt out Christians and
to release all who renounced the faith, no matter how suspect previously); see also
GAZETTI, supra note 47, at 355; B.H. Streeter, The Rise of Christianity, in 11 CAMBRIDGE
ANCIENT HISTORY, supra note 47, at 253, 256 ("[Ihe point of Trajan's rescript is that,
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The emperor's dedication to following established legal rules
shines through his official correspondence with Pliny the
Younger, then imperial governor of the Province of Bithynia-
Pontus in Asia Minor. In his rescripts to Pliny, we find Trajan
following established rules of sanctification,86 interpreting and
following the terms of an earlier decree of the senate," and defer-
ring to the local law of the province on the respective priorities of
municipal creditors88 and on whether benefit societies are permit-
ted."9
Trajan, or at least his advisors, were technical, but by no
means mechanical, in applying established legal rules. A sample
of the discernment applied is Trajan's response to a question
about the punishment of slaves found trying to enter the military
(which was by law to be composed exclusively of freemen), and
whether it made any difference whether a slave had been actually
enrolled in a particular unit.90 Trajan answered by distinguishing
among three sets of situations. First, if recruiting officers had
pulled the slaves into the army, those officers were the guilty par-
ties.9 Second, if people seeking to avoid military service had pre-
sented the slaves as proxies, then the fault was with the present-
ers.92 Third, if the slaves were truly volunteers (and this required
that they know of their disability), then they had to be pun-
ished.93 Trajan did not believe that it was important whether a
slave had yet been enrolled.94
One topic that recently attracted public interest is the extent to
which officials can alter established election rules after the elec-
tion or preliminary event (such as qualification of an initiative
petition) already has occurred. There is authority for the proposi-
tion that this kind of retroactive rule rewriting violates the Four-
though in the last resort the authority of law must be upheld, its nonobservance in this
case is to be connived at so far as is decently possible."). But see T.D. Barnes, Legislation
Against the Christians, 58 J. ROMIAN STUD. 32, 48 (1968) (opining that Trajan actually ini-
tiated the first specific legislation against the Christians).
86. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.71.
87. Id. at 10.73.
88. Id. at 10.109.
89. Id. at 10.93.
90. Id. at 10.29.
91. Id. at 10.30.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also id. at 10.119 (another example of close legal reasoning).
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teenth Amendment to the Constitution. However, one can point
to a number of cases in which it has happened. Thus, in 1999, in
the author's home state of Montana, the supreme court over-
turned a successful citizens' initiative by altering after the elec-
tion certain long-standing qualification/election rules relied on by
the initiative's spoiisors, by state officials, and by the electorate
that approved the measure.96 Trajan would not approve. In
Bithynia-Pontus, the law required municipal senators to be citi-
zens of the cities in whose senates they served. Nevertheless, the
law had been widely ignored as municipalities sought to honor
outstanding men from other places. Trajan's solution was to pre-
serve the customary rules under which existing senators had
been elected-they were allowed to retain their positions-while
commanding compliance with the written law in the future.97
C. The Duty of Loyalty
1. The Ideology of Service
The duty of loyalty in modern trust law is undergirded by the
principle that the trustee must serve only the beneficiary: "Per-
haps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must dis-
play.., complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary and
must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the in-
terests of third persons."8 This ideal has become an ideology, ex-
pressed in the famous words of Justice Cardozo:
95. See e.g., Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Davis
v. Alabama, 516 U.S. 908 (1995); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978); Kean v.
Clark, 56 F. Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
96. Marshall v. State, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1999), retroactively overruling explicitly,
State v. Cooney, 225 P. 1007 (Mont. 1924); State v. Alderson, 142 P. 210 (Mont. 1914);
State v. Bd. of Comm'r, 87 P. 450 (Mont. 1906), and implicitly, State ex rel. Montana Citi-
zens for Pres. of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, 729 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1986) (holding that
multifariousness of an initiative does not make it facially invalid); Sawyer Stores v.
Mitchell, 62 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1936) (insofar as it rejected requiring a separate law for every
provision of existing law changed)).
As of this writing, Marshall has not been challenged, but an analogous action by the
State of Mississippi was invalidated by a federal court the same year. Kean v. Clark, 56 F.
Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (holding that retroactive state alteration of petition rules to
invalidate already validated petition constitutes content-based discrimination in violation
of the U.S, Constitution).
97. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.115 (discussing rules regarding senators). For another
example of Trajan's protection of reliance interests, see id. at 10.111 (allowing people who
received public donations illegally to keep them after twenty years).
98. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 543, at 217.
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A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has de-
veloped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompro-
mising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti-
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.
99
As Professor Bennett points out, Trajan's reign was permeated
by an ideology of service.00 The imperial propaganda was that
Trajan's reign began, or perhaps continued, from Nerva, a new
age of government guided by this ideology. The felicitas tempo-
rum, the happiness of the times, or the felicitas saeculi, the hap-
piness of the age, were both descriptions and goals to be served.' '
The emperor was unlike a trustee in that he was appointed by
the gods, not by a settlor or a court. But like a trustee, the em-
peror was to care for his charges as God cares for mankind, 0 2 or
as a parent cares for his or her children.' 3 The welfare of his
subjects was the ideal ruler's guidestar,0 4 as the welfare of the
beneficiary is the purpose of the trust. The ideal ruler's fate, like
that of the trustee, was to toil unselfishly for those it was his duty
to serve.'0 5 Like the trustee's duties, the ruler's obligations were
ties of strict loyalty. "If he failed to honour his obligations in this
way.., he was no better than a traitor to himself and his pol-ity . . . . i0
The reign of the ideal ruler was not oppressive or overly pater-
nal. The well-governed empire was a land where people were
free. °" Like the private trust, it was governed by justice and by
the rule of law, and not by the tyrant's whim. 08 Just as a trustee
99. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1929). Interestingly enough, the case
involved not a trustee but a joint venturer, for whom the applicable standard normally is
somewhat lower. See id. at 462; supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing enter-
prises in which the manager and the managed each have an interest in the enterprise's
success).
100. BENNEr, supra note 44, at 65.
101. Id. The spirit or happiness of the age or of the times are recurrent themes in the
Trajanic written product. See PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.55, 10.97; DIG. 48.22.1; cf.
PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 36.4, 40.4, 42, 44.1.
102. BENNETt, supra note 44, at 64, 68-70.
103. Id. at 66.
104 Id. at 68-70.
105. Id. at 67-69; see also GARZETrI, supra note 47, at 318.
106. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 70.
107. Id. at 65.
108. Id. at 69.
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must choose good agents, °9 the perfect emperor selected agents
from the most nearly perfect of his subjects;"0 and among the im-
perial armies, he maintained perfect military discipline."'
Dio Cassius, often sparing in his praise of emperors, is fulsome
in describing Trajan:
Trajan was most conspicuous for his justice, for his bravery, and
for the simplicity of his habits. He was strong in body, being in his
forty-second year when he began to rule, so that in every enterprise
he toiled almost as much as the others; and his mental powers were
at their highest, so that he had neither the recklessness of youth nor
the sluggishness of old age. He did not envy or slay any one, but hon-
oured and exalted all good men without exception, and hence he nei-
ther feared nor hated any one of them. To slanders he paid very little
heed and he was no slave of anger. He refrained equally from the
money of others and from unjust murders. He expended vast sums
on wars and vast sums on works of peace; and while making very
many urgently needed repairs to roads and harbours and public
buildings, he drained no one's blood for any of these undertak-
ings.... His association with the people was marked by affability
and his intercourse with the senate with dignity.... And even if he
did delight in war, nevertheless he was satisfied when success had
been achieved, a most bitter foe overthrown and his countrymen ex-
alted. Nor did the result which usually occurs in such circumstances
-conceit and arrogance on the part of the soldiers-ever manifest it-
self during his reign; with such a firm hand did he rule them.
112
In partial fulfillment of the imperial obligation to protect the
weak was Trajan's extension of Nerva's alimenta program,
whereby the state loaned agricultural land to private individuals
who paid the interest to cities, who in turn used the money to
support poor children."' Other enactments reflect the same value
of care: measures suppressing crime," 4 founding of colonies for
109. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
110. BENNETr, supra note 44, at 66.
111. Id. at 66, 70. In this sentence, I am playing off the fact that Trajan's most treas-
ured title, Optimus, can mean something akin to the way modern Americans use the word
"perfect."
112. Dio, supra note 1, at 68.7.
113. Id. at 68.5.4; see also PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 51; Peter Garmsley, Trajan's Ali-
menta: Some Problems, 17 HIST. 367 (1968); Longden, supra note 47, at 210-12. The ali-
menta also aided middling farmers who otherwise might have had trouble obtaining fi-
nancing. See BENNETT, supra note 44, at 81-84.
114. See DIG. 47.14.3.3 (suppressing rustlers); PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.19 (suppress-
ing bribery); id. at 10.32 (advocating the punishment of criminals); id. at 10.78 (preventing
breaches of public order); see also DIG. 47.11.6.1 (protection of the grain supply from false
balances); id. 48.13.5(4).4(7) (suppressing embezzlement). Trajan's famous hostility to pri-
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military veterans,"5 and that chief duty of all who would rule at
Rome, protecting the city's grain supply."6 Trajan's greatest and
most lasting show of care for the empire was his stupendous
building program, the remains of which are found not only in
Rome, but also across the Mediterranean world." 7
2. The Duty of Loyalty: The Trustee Must Subordinate His
Interest to the Beneficiary's Interest
Indeed, when [the newly-installed Emperor Trajan] first handed
to the man who was to be prefect of the Praetorians the sword which
this official was required to wear at his side, he bared the blade and
holding it up said: "Take this sword, in order that, if I rule well, you
may use it for me, but if ill, against me."118
The above statement illustrates the most important rule of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty: the trustee's obligation is to subordinate
entirely his interests to those of the beneficiaries." 9
It is not bold to state that, despite occasional references to "the
public trust" and "outstanding public servants," American politi-
cal practice falls well short of this standard. Politicians are, with
good reason, seen as seeking their own interests. This, in turn,
fuels public cynicism toward government. Over the last few dec-
ades, an entire field of economics, "Public Choice," has grown up
vate associations was partly a crime-prevention measure. See PL.EP., supra note 1, at
10.34; cf id. at 10.93.
115. See, e.g., DIG. 50.15.8; VICTOR, supra note 1, at 13.4; GARzETTI, supra note 47, at
344.
116. The fourth-century biographer Sextus Aurelius Victor reports, "et annonae per-
petuae mire consultum reperto firmatoque pistorum collegio," that is, "Trajan strengthened
the miller's guild to aid the grain supply." VICTOR, supra note 1, at 13.5. Some of the em-
peror's enactments in this regard have survived. See G. INST. 1.34 (giving the citizenship
to millers with Latin rights who grind more than 100 modii of grain per day); GIovANNI
GUALANDI, LEGISLAZIONE IMPERIALE E GIURISPRUDENZA, Vat. Frag. 233, at 17 (Milano,
Universita di Roma 1963) (Ulpian, liber de officio praetoris tutelaris: recording that Trajan
also excused those millers from guardianship duty); see also DIG. 47.11.6.1 (protection of
the grain supply from false balances). But see id. 27.1.17.6 (the exemption from guardian-
ship duties did not extend to shipowners).
117. See BENNETT, supra note 44, at 138-60; GARZET7, supra note 47, at 329-39;
PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 51. Constantine the Great, who ruled 200 years after Trajan,
supposedly called Trajan a wall-climbing plant because his name was on so many build-
ings. See EPIT., supra note 1, at 41.13.
118. DIO, supra note 1, at 68.16.1; cf VICTOR, supra note 1, at 13.9 ("'Tibi istum ad
munimentum mei committo, si recte again; sin aliter in me magis."); BIRLEY, supra note
71, at 38.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
218 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:191
correlating political outcomes with the personal interests of poli-
ticians. 1
20
Of course one can never banish private interest entirely from
any field of endeavor. However, modem trust law contains rules
designed to buttress the subordination principle by tying the in-
terests of trustees to those of their charges, 12' eliminating con-
flicts of interest, 22 and imposing clear and strict rules of con-
duct.123
The principle of subordination to the interests of the benefici-
aries runs like a motif throughout Trajan's administration. As the
quotation extracted above shows, the emperor began his reign by,
in effect, ordering his Praetorian Prefect to kill him, as Domi-
tian's functionaries had killed him,124 if he ever violated his trust.
At another time, Trajan encapsulated his philosophy of govern-
ment in his own variation on the Golden Rule. He said that he
wanted to be the same kind of emperor toward private citizens as
he would have wished an emperor to be if he had been a private
citizen.
125
Allegations of self-denial were not unusual among Roman rul-
ers,"'26 but in this case, the conduct honored the words.'27 On his
accession in A.D. 98, Trajan surprised many by lingering on the
Rhine and Danube borders to complete the defenses there rather
than hastening to Rome to enjoy the fruits of power." Because of
120. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
121. See, e.g., BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 975, at 13, 15 (explaining that the
compensation of a trustee is tied to the value of principal or income in the trust);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. b (1959) (explaining that the compensation
of a trustee is tied to the value of the principal or income in the trust); cf. id. § 243 (ex-
plaining that a breach of trust may result in reduced compensation or no compensation to
the trustee).
122. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 543, at 218.
123. E.g., id. § 543(A), at 271 (stating that a trustee is not permitted to buy at his own
sale).
124. SUET., supra note 1, Domitian 17.1 to .2.
125. EUT., supra note 1, at 8.5.1 ("respondit talem se imperatorem esse privatis, quales
esse sibi imperatores privatus optasset").
126. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King, 72 J. ROMAN
STUD. 32, 36-37 (1982) (stating that self-denial, or recusatio, was a basis of the princi-
pate's ritual); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
127. Ancient historians frequently mention Trajan's spirit of self-denial. Thus, Sextus
Aurelius Victor describes him as "[flair, forgiving, very patient and very faithful to his
friends." VICTOR, supra note 1, at 13.9. He adds that "[i]ndeed also the love of wine, with
which vice Nerva was afflicted, [Trajan] had moderated with prudence, prohibiting his or-
ders after long repasts from being carried out." Id. at 13.10.
128. BIRTEY, supra note 71, at 38-40.
GOVERNMENT AS FIDUCIARY
his absence from Rome, Trajan declined election as consul ordi-
narius (one of the year's initial consuls) for A.D. 99.129 Refusing
this honor was particularly remarkable given the recent imperial
practice of monopolizing it. 30 When Trajan finally did return, his
procession through the provinces was marked by unusually mod-
erate expenditure and respect for lives and property. 3' His entry
into the capital, on foot, was similarly unassuming.3 2 This em-
phasis on moderation continued throughout his reign. 3
When other emperors needed help, they had conscripted it.
When Trajan sought to add a useful person to his staff, he al-
lowed the man to decline for reasons of personal preference. 34
The emperor's own inclinations were military, but as Dio notes,
he subordinated his preferences by conscientiously performing his
civilian duties:
He did not, however, as might have been expected of a warlike
man, pay any less attention to the civil administration nor did he
dispense justice any the less; on the contrary, he conducted trials,
now in the Forum of Augustus, now in the Portico of Livia, as it was
called, and often elsewhere on a tribunal.
135
Pliny has left us several eyewitness descriptions of Trajan's
diligence in conducting judicial trials. 3 '
During the previous century, suspicious emperors had relied
heavily on paid informers to ferret out possible opposition. Evi-
dence from informers was supplemented by torturing slaves to
induce them to testify against their masters. Emperors recur-
rently terrorized Rome's upper classes with trials for treason,
executions, seizures of estates, and forced disinheritance. There
was little freedom of speech, even in the senate. Wealthy Romans
protected themselves by keeping their mouths shut and bribing
129. PLPAN., supra note 1, at 56.3.
130. This was especially true under the Flavian Emperors: Vespasian, Titus, and Do-
mitian. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 44, at 44 (stating that Trajan and a colleague were
only the second pair of nonimperial ordinarii in Domitian's reign); SUET., supra note 1,
Vespasian 24.1 (showing that Vespasian held consulate nine times in a ten-year reign),
Domitian 13.3 (showing that Domitian held the consulate 17 times).
131. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 20.2-3, 22.1-2.
132. BMLEY, supra note 71, at 40.
133. See, e.g., PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.43 (stating that there was a reduction of ex-
penditure on delegations to salute the emperor).
134. BENNETr, supra note 44, at 66; PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 86.
135. DIO, supra note 1, at 68.10.2.
136. See PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.22, 6.31.
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the emperor, either with inter vivos gifts or with a portion of their
inheritances; thus, they sought to preserve the balance of their
estates.
During his short reign, Trajan's predecessor, Nerva, largely
ended imperial abuses, 3 v and during his long reign, Trajan
avoided them almost entirely. Specifically, he suppressed and ex-
iled many informers, 3 ' stopped using slaves for political pur-
poses,'139 ended the treason trials, 4 ' ceased property forfeitures,'
enforced wills regardless of whether they bequeathed anything to
the emperor,' declined various gifts,' and restored freedom of
speech in the senate.' Pliny said, "You order us to be free, and so
we are free."'45
The end of forfeitures was particularly impressive since under
Domitian's reign the forfeiture of estates had been a significant
revenue source.'46 Trajan went even further by restoring un-
needed imperial estates to the private sector, either by gift or by
sale.1
47
Under previous rulers, another source of revenue had been to
137. For a summary of Nerva's policies, see Longden, supra note 47, at 188-99.
138. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 118; PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 34-36. Some informers
were around years later. Pliny served as assessor (judicial assistant) to the emperor in a
trial in which the side that used an informer lost. See PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.31.
139. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 42. Along the same line, imperial grants of freedom to
slaves manumitted without notice to their masters would not prejudice the estates of those
masters. G. INST. 3.32.
140. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.82; PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 42; see also EUT., supra
note 1, at 8.4 ("[O]mni eius aetate unus senator damnatus sit atque is tamen per senatum
ignorante Traian[o].--"[Tlhroughout his reign one senator was condemned and that was
by the senate with Trajan not knowing about it.").
141. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 50 (no seizures of property); DIG. 48.22.1 (no seizure of
goods of exiles).
142. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 43; see also DIG. 49.14.13 (discussing the "Benefit of
Trajan"); see infra at notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing the "Benefit of Tra-
jan" in greater detail).
143. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 41.1.
144. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 66 (freedom of speech); PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 36.2-
3. On Trajan's administration generally, historian Dio Cassius wrote: "When he came to
Rome he did much to reform the administration of affairs and much to please the better
element...." DIO, supra note 1, at 68.5.4. Pliny pointed out that Trajan's mildness im-
proved the military, too: "[N]o one in command need fear to be unpopular-or popular with
his men." PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 18.2.
145. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 65; IL.PAN., supra note 1, at 66. One is reminded of
the conduct of the democratization of the Japanese people after World War ii, made possi-
ble by imperial order.
146. Longden, supra note 47, at 194; see also SUET., supra note 1, Domitian 12.1 to .2.
147. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 50.
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conscript wealthy people to borrow government funds not cur-
rently being used, and to pay to the government hefty rates of in-
terest on those unwanted loans. Trajan stopped this practice,
telling his officials that if they wanted to place government loans
they needed to find voluntary borrowers, even if it meant lower-
ing the interest rate."'
Time and again Trajan told his agents to, in effect, read his
lips: No new taxes. At his accession, he forgave the aurum coro-
narium ("coronation gold"), the tribute generally collected from
the provinces when a new emperor came into office, 4 9 as well as
several other exactions imposed on provincials. 5 ' In his corre-
spondence with Pliny when the latter was a provincial governor,
Trajan refused to authorize new spending unless it came from
existing revenue sources.' 5 ' Trajan rewarded Hadrian with a con-
sulate partly because Hadrian had restrained tax collectors dur-
ing his tenure as praetorian legate to the province of Lower Pan-
nonia.'52 Even Trajan's major social spending initiative, the
expansion of the alimenta,'53 was funded without a tax in-
crease.
154
Trajan's government was frugal enough that he was able to re-
duce taxes even before bringing home a massive amount of booty
from the Dacian Wars. During his first two years in office, he
greatly extended Nerva's cuts in the inheritance tax. As Nerva
had exempted estates inherited from father to son, Trajan ex-
empted estates passed from a son to a father--"for [he] would not
suffer taxes to be levied on a father's tears!"55 This was only one
of a number of inheritance tax exemptions adopted, including a
complete exemption for smaller estates. 56
All told, Trajan's self-denying attitude toward revenue 57 is a
148. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.55.
149. GARZE2ri, supra note 47, at 315.
150. Longden, supra note 47, at 213 (discussing remission of aurum coronarium and of
several other exactions).
151. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.24; see also id. at 10.91.
152. H.A., supra note 1, Hadrian 3.9 to .10.
153. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
154. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 27.4, 29.4.
155. [Q~uod lacrimasparentum vectigales esse non pateris." Id. at 38.3.
156. E.g., id. at 39 (exempting from taxation estates passing between grandchildren
and grandparents, among brothers and sisters, and among those who had attained citi-
zenship through Latin rights); id. at 39-40 (exempting small estates from taxation).
157. Cf. EUT., supra note 1, at 8.4 ("[Nihil iniustum ad augendum fiscum agens.'-
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refreshing contrast to modern practices-when government agen-
cies engage in ceaseless public relations efforts to convince poll-
cymakers and the public to increase the size of their budgets.
D. The Duty of Impartiality
Interest group politics, resulting in redistribution of resources
and privileges from one group to another, long has been a feature
of American public life. However, private sector managers gener-
ally are not permitted to engage in redistribution among those
they serve, absent specific authorization in the operative docu-
ments."8 The duty of impartiality is the fiduciary obligation that
prohibits trustees from favorably treating some beneficiaries at
the expense of others, whether those beneficiaries are concurrent
or successive.'59 A trustee must act with "due regard" to each
beneficiary's "respective interests." 6 °
Trajan was a product of this time, so his solicitude for treating
people impartially did not extend to slaves' 6' or to prisoners of
"Doing nothing unjust to increase the imperial treasury.").
158. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1547-54 (1982). Perhaps the most common exception is the power of a trustee to invade
the corpus, if necessary, for the maintenance of a life tenant, who is often a widow or wid-
ower. See Alexander v. Alexander, 561 S.W.2d 59, 65-68 (Ark. 1978).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959). The text of section 183 (Duty to
Deal Impartially with Beneficiaries) states: "When there are two or more beneficiaries of a
trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them." Id. Comment a to section
183 clarifies the rule, stating: "The rule stated in this Section is applicable whether the
beneficiaries are entitled to interests in the trust property simultaneously or successively."
Id. § 183 cmt. a; see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 163-66.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (1959). Section 232 (Impartiality be-
tween Successive Beneficiaries) states: "If a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession,
the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their
respective interests." Id. Comment a, which states when section 232 is applicable, pro-
vides:
The rule stated in this Section is an application of the broader rule stated
in § 183 that where there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee
is under a duty to deal impartially with them. That rule is applicable whether
the beneficiaries are entitled to interests in the trust property simultaneously
or successively.
Id. § 232 cmt. a.
Comment d refers to what duties the section is applicable. "The rule stated in
this Section is applicable to the duty of the trustee in making or continuing invest-
ments, to the general management of the trust estate, the making of repairs and re-
placements, and to the allocation or receipts and expenditures to principal and in-
come." Id. § 232 cmt. d.
161. Although even slaves received additional legal protection. DIG. 40.5.26.7 (granting
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war, many of whom died in the arena or lost their homes.'62 How-
ever, he did extend the principle of impartiality more widely than
had been done previously, and in some ways, more widely than
we extend it in public law today.
Trajan's benevolence toward children is, to be sure, consistent
with the spirit of our public law. Indeed, it is one of the most at-
tractive aspects of his reign. One reason for his policies was
doubtless military: the need for future soldiers and the mothers of
future soldiers-for some aspects of these policies are clearly tied
to military needs.'63 But military needs do not fully explain pro-
grams such as the alimenta," the manumission of foundlings, 65
and the protection of children both from parental abuse'66 and
from theft by faithless guardians.67
Trajan's evenhanded care for the provinces and for noncitizen
provincials also is consistent with our law. 6 ' As noted earlier,
Trajan relieved provincials from the "coronation gold" and from
several other impositions. 6 9 He sent wheat to Egypt when that
country's usually reliable crop failed,7 ° rewarded agents who gov-
erned the provinces well,' 7' punished those who had acted inap-
propriately," and avoided imposing new taxes on the provin-
cials. 73  Under his administration, a growing number of
provincials entered the senate and other high offices. 174 His corre-
freedom despite the noncooperation of a master who was bound to grant it).
162. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 101. On the lavishness of Trajan's arena "spectacu-
lars," see also Longden, supra note 47, at 215.
163. DIG. 49.16.4.12 (protecting children for military service); see also BENNETT, supra
note 44, at 119 (validating military wills).
164. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 27-28. See generally BENNETt, supra note 44, at 81-84
(pointing out that the program served agricultural and humanitarian, as well as military
purposes).
165. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.66
166. DIG. 37.12.5 (requiring abusive father to manumit son).
167. COD. 5.75.5.
168. On Trajan's general care for the provinces, see HENDERSON, supra note 47, at
200-11. Henderson makes the point that while Trajan's attentions were well meant, his
practice of appointing curatores in Italy and the provinces was so extended by his succes-
sors that it led to a breakdown in local government. Id. at 202.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
170. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 30-32.
17L Id. at 70.8; see also H.A., supra note 1, Hadrian 3.9 to .10. The empress Plotina is
said to have encouraged good provincial government. EPIT., supra note 1, at 42.21.
172. BENNETt, supra note 44, at 76-77.
173. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.24 (no new taxes); PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 29.4.
174. HENDERSON, supra note 47, at 170; Longden, supra note 47, at 221-22 (referenc-
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spondence with Pliny highlights his concern for provincial inter-
ests. 7 5 We see him deferring to local laws, customs, and institu-
tions; 76 authorizing public works such as canals,'77 aqueducts,7 8
and sewers;... and studiously avoiding practices for the sole rea-
son that they would inconvenience the provincials. 8 °
It is in his treatment of individuals whose interests clashed
with the state, however, that Trajan's policy of impartiality went
beyond our own public law. Early in his reign, he reorganized the
courts that adjudicated disputes between taxpayers and the im-
perial treasury so that the taxpayers more often won.' That does
not seem remarkable to Americans only a few years after reforms
in the Internal Revenue Service,8 2 but that was not all. Trajan
made it clear that he considered his duty toward individuals as
important as his duty toward governments.'83 He rejected the
preferential mechanisms, so common in our system, that give
governments the upper hand in disputes with private citizens.
For example, in our law, creditors who are governmental enti-
ties routinely enjoy priority over private creditors."s Insofar as he
could do so without ignoring local institutions, Trajan rejected
such priorities.8 5 Similarly, our law protects the negligent judge,
and most other negligent officials, from direct liability for the
ing, inter alia, "Trajan's readiness to favour a competent man whatever his origins").
175. See PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.18, 10.22.
176. Id. at 10.80, 10.91 (following local rules regarding citizenship).
177. Id. at 10.38, 10.42.
178. Id. at 10.62.
179. Id. at 10.99.
180. Id. at 10.69 (avoiding hardship for provincials); id. at 10.44 (relieving provincials
of unnecessary expense); id. at 10.55 (discussing coerced loans); see also PL.PAN., supra
note 1, at 29.3-5 (paying allies who supply wheat).
181. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 36.3-4. This may have been a continuation of a reform
begun under Nerva. Longden, supra note 47, at 193.
182. E.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-58, §§ 102-03, 113 Stat. 430, 437 (1999) (discussing the education of Internal Reve-
nue Service employers in taxpayer rights and maintaining taxpayer confidentiality).
183. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.111 (explaining that cities may not use old claims to
disturb long-held private fortunes, for "Non minus enim hominibus cuiusque loci, quam
pecuniae publicae consultum volo," that is, "For I want to take no less account of individu-
als in each place than I do of government funds.").
184. See, e.g., NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 353-54 (discussing the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation being treated as a holder in due course of commercial pa-
per owned by failed bank even though a private party taking paper in similar circum-
stances would be disqualified); 5 POWELL, supra note 34, § 39.04[3] (discussing the priority
of real property tax liens over preexisting private interests).
185. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.109.
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harm they do.' 86 Trajan ruled that city magistrates responsible
for appointing a faithless guardian, who left the ward's estate
bankrupt, could be liable for the loss."8 7 Our law sharply limits
the right to compensation for government takings,' Trajan's
government protected individuals against preventable losses and
compensated for others."'
E. The Trustee Must Exercise Reasonable Care
1. Public Law in the United States
Outside of discrete areas, American law does not impose fidu-
ciary-style obligations of due care on public officials. Legislators
may vote with impunity for legislation based on slender, or no,
empirical grounds; at most, they may be defeated for reelection or
see their handiwork invalidated by the courts, although rarely
even then. They do not suffer personal liability for the damage
they do. Judicial immunity is absolute, except for ungainly re-
moval remedies, such as impeachment. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity, except where waived, protects administrators from re-
sponsibility for actions that may impose great loss on private citi-
zens, on the general public, or on the government itself. Waivers
of immunity may be limited to fairly small amounts. 9 °
Even in the financial area, where the standards are higher,
government financial practice often is less rigorous than that in
the private sector.' 9 '
186. Cf. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 44 (N.M. 1991) (holding that a court-appointed
guardian ad litem is absolutely immune from liability for work on behalf of court, but H-
able if operating as a private fiduciary).
187. COD. 5.75.5; cf. RESTATEAIENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (explaining the
duty to use reasonable care in selection of agents).
188. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
189. See G. INST. 3.72; J. INST. 3.7.4; COD. 7.6.1, 7.6.12 (preventing an imperial grant of
citizenship to a patron's client from prejudicing the patron's inheritance rights); PL.?AN.,
supra note 1, at 29.3-5 (paying for goods requisitioned, even from noncitizens); PL.EP., su-
pra note 1, at 10.55 (rejecting standard practice of forcing wealthy citizens to borrow ex-
cess government funds).
190. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
191. One example of legislative problems arising from reliance on misleading official
financial statements from government agencies is discussed in Robert G. Natelson, Con-
dominiums, Reform, and the Unit Ownership Act, 58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 516 (1997). In
this case, erroneous official figures induced the Montana state legislature to adopt tax
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By contrast, private fiduciaries, even though they enjoy a good
deal less power than agents of the sovereign, are bound by strict
standards of care. For example, in the management of a trust,
"the trustee is required to manifest the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence of an ordinarily prudent man engaged in similar busi-
ness affairs and with objectives similar to those of the trust in
question."'92 Moreover, in contradistinction to the political arena,
where there is a tendency to justify harmful acts by pleading good
intentions, in the trust context, "[tihe duty to use the care and
skill of an ordinarily prudent man is absolute. The fact that the
trustee was honest and well intentioned will not excuse him from
the manifestation of the required amount of diligence and pru-
dence."'93 How much closer Trajan's standards approached our fi-
duciary norms than our governmental norms appears partly from
the discussion regarding his care for the provinces. 94 Additional
light is cast by an examination of other financial, judicial, and
administrative enactments.
2. The Duty of Care: Financial Measures
Early in his reign, Trajan took several steps to ensure greater
fiscal accountability in government. The state treasury (aerar-
ium) had become greatly entangled with the imperial estate (fis-
cus), and Trajan separated them to the extent possible.9 5 In doing
so, he anticipated the modern trustee's obligation to segregate the
trust assets and not mingle them with his own assets or with
those of other trusts.96 Furthermore, he ordered publication of
imperial travel expenses and took other steps to maintain the in-
tegrity of government financial accounting.9 v
measures that provoked a popular revolt of which your author was the principal leader.
192. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 167; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
193. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 177.
194. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
195. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 124-26. On the fiscus, see Fergus Millar, The Fiscus
in the First Two Centuries, 53 J. ROMAN STUD. 29 (1963).
196. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 161; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959) (explaining the duty to keep funds separate).
197. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 126; PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 20.5-6 (describing the
publication of travel expenses); see also PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 48.22.1 (maintaining in-
tegrity of accounts cited as a reason for not seizing goods of exiles); cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959) (explaining the trustee's duty to furnish information to
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Under fiduciary law, a trustee must collect and preserve the
trust principal.198 Parallels in Trajan's administration include
legislation on embezzlement,'99 an order for the investigation of a
waste of public funds, 2 ' and an order for investigation of private
accounts with public implications.20 ' He enforced financial prom-
ises made by private citizens to cities,0 2 and refined procedures
for interaction between provincials and fiscal officers. 20 ' The
Benefit of Trajan2° offered rewards for those voluntarily relin-
quishing to the state treasury improperly retained inheritances.
The worldwide phenomenon of privatization of unproductive
state assets reflects an understanding that sometimes a govern-
ment can further the public interest by disposing of assets rather
than merely by amassing more. Trajan conducted his own priva-
tization plan by selling and giving away underutilized imperial
property.20
5
3. The Duty of Care: Selection and Supervision of Agents
The princeps could not rule the empire alone. He needed loyal
and competent agents. Modern fiduciary law requires a trustee to
exercise reasonable care in selecting, supervising, and investi-
gating agents.20 ' This section discusses some of the methods by
which Trajan complied with modern fiduciary standards in that
regard.
The first thing was to choose excellent subordinates. There is
every indication that Trajan did this. The student of the era gains
beneficiary).
198. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 160-61.
199. DIG. 48.13.4.7.
200. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.38.
20L Id. at 10.82.
202. DIG. 50.12.14 (promise to construct a work for the city); cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 177 (1959) (discussing the duty to enforce claims).
203. GUALANDI, supra note 116, Frag. de lure Fisci 6, at 17 (Edicto divi Traiani
cavetur, ne qui provincialium cum servis fiscalibus contrahunt nisi absignante procuratore:
quod factum dupli damno vel reliquorum exsolutione pensatur.).
204. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
205. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 50.5 (describing the sale of such property); id. at 50.7
(describing the donation of such property); see also PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.70 to .71
(describing the donation of imperial property to the City of Prusa). This apparently con-
tinued a program begun under Nerva. Longden, supra note 47, at 195.
206. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TRUSTS 335 (5th ed. 1973). This is a hornbook edition of the work cited supra note 22.
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confidence in the ability and dedication of counselors and agents
such as Neratius Priscus, Hadrian, °7 Juventius Celsus, Pliny,
and Trajan's special friend, Lucius Licinius Sura. °s In this cate-
gory also, one must include Trajan's wife, the Empress Plotina.
She is said to have had an active interest in assuring honest gov-
ernment for the provinces 9 and in improving the resolution of fi-
nancial disputes between the treasury and the general public.210
Her comportment is captured by historian Dio Cassius:
When Plotina, his wife, first entered the palace, she turned round
so as to face the stairway and the populace and said: "I enter here
such a woman as I would fain be when I depart." And she conducted
herself during the entire reign in such manner as to incur no cen-
211
sure.
Trajan applied rigorous selection procedures to less exalted of-
fices as well. Pliny tells how the emperor, by selecting judges
more impartial than previous ones, ensured that in cases between
taxpayers and imperial treasury, the taxpayers often won.212
Key to good administration is a proper arrangement of incen-
tives and disincentives. We know of three relevant actions in
Trajan's administration. The first was a law curbing conflicts of
interest in the senate by requiring all candidates for office to in-
vest at least a third of their resources in Italian land. At a time
when land comprised much of society's wealth, this helped ensure
that senators would feel directly the impact of their domestic
policies, for good or ill.2 3 The second was an edict called the bene-
ficium Traiani, or Benefit of Trajan.214 Designed, perhaps, as a
substitute for the disgraced system of informers, it offered cash
rewards to putative heirs (many, if not most of whom, would have
been in the higher orders and thus in Trajan's service) who volun-
tarily came forward to report that they might receive an inheri-
207. For Hadrian's record in maintaining military discipline and restraining over-
reaching tax collectors, partly for which he was rewarded with a consulate, see BRLEY,
supra note 71, at 53; H.A., supra note 1, Hadrian 3.9 to .10.
208. For a more complete list of Trajan's counselors or amici, see GARZETI, supra note
47, at 340-41 and Longden, supra note 47, at 221-22.
209. EPIT., supra note 1, at 42.21.
210. BENNETT, supra note 44, at 77.
211. DIO, supra note 1, at 68.5.5.
212. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 36.3-4.
213. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.19.
214. DIG. 49.14.13pr; see also id. 34.9.5.20 (making a later reference to the Benefit of
Trajan).
GOVERNMENT AS FIDUCIARY
tance that legally should go to the state treasury (aerarium).
Each award amounted to one-half of the sum collected that was
due the treasury.215
Third, the emperor let it be known that agents in his service
would be held accountable if they failed to adhere to high ethical
standards,216 and that, like everyone else, they were subject to the
law. In one case, the heirs of a testator commenced a lawsuit
charging two defendants with forging part of a will. One of the de-
fendants was Eurythmus, a freedman and procurator (adminis-
trative officer) of the emperor. When some of the heirs, perhaps
concluding that discretion was the better part of valor, offered to
drop the suit against Eurythmus, Trajan reassured them with the
remark, "Nec ille Polyclitus est nec ego Nero"-"Neither is he
Polyclitus nor am I Nero"--thereby letting the heirs know that
unlike Nero's freedman Polyclitus, Trajan's agents were not
above the law. The suit went forward.1
Trajan's insistence on compliance with law and morality did
not mean that he micromanaged his agents. On the contrary, so
long as they served him well, he let them fulfill their duties with
relatively little interference.21 8
However, among those most dangerous of the emperor's subor-
dinates, the troops, the emperor insisted upon strict discipline.
Unrest among the soldiers had unseated several emperors, and
might have unseated Nerva had he not adopted Trajan.21 '9 Hence,
215. There is a mystery surrounding the Benefit: Why, under this edict, were the facts
justifying forfeiture reported to the state treasury or aerarium while the forfeitures them-
selves were to the emperor's estate or fiscus? While there are other possible answers, I be-
lieve that the text of the edict was altered, either before, during, or after the compilation of
Justinian's Digest. The change might have resulted from a desire to set forth more closely
the substantive law as it existed during the life of the copyist: for even by the time of
Paulus, the writer who is our source for the fragment (early third century), the aerarium
had ceased to be of much importance. The Benefit of Trajan is reported in the Digest under
the heading "De lure Fisci;" there is no section entitled "De Iure Aerarii." The change could
not have been an accident. It is repeated in the Digest at 49.14.13.1, 49.14.13.3, and
49.14.13.5.
216. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.31 (discharging and exiling a centurian for having an af-
fair with another's wife).
217. Id. at 6.31. The final result is not known, because the letter ends by reporting a
procedural adjournment. Id.
218. PL.PAN., supra note 1, at 93 (speaking of the consuls). But see PL.EP., supra note
1, at 10.46 (describing how provincial governors were required to obey the rules in using
the cursus publicus, the imperial postal system).
219. Trajan was adopted when army discipline was breaking down. PL.PAN., supra
note 1, at 6.2.
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Trajan gave discipline much of his attention,22 ° and there were no
major incidents of military unrest during his two decades in of-
fice.2 2
1
In addition to the foregoing, the emperor prescribed various
procedural devices to improve the quality of his agents' admini-
stration and to protect citizens from abuse. These are discussed in
the following section.
4. The Duty of Care: Judicial and Administrative Procedures
A trustee has a duty to follow procedures appropriate to sound
decision making. "The element of skill or judgment... would ap-
pear to include the use of proper safeguards and internal proce-
dures as well as consideration of the advice of specialists or ex-
perts when necessary to make informed decisions."222 Trajan
acted extensively and competently as a judge in important
cases, 223 and he was quite concerned with process. Many specific
enactments reflect his belief that for his government to be worthy
of the felicitas temporum, judges needed to follow judicial proce-
dures that were efficient,224 promoted the discovery of truth,225 did
not foment social division,226 and were perceived as fair.227
220. DIG. 2.12.9 (stating that normal holidays do not relieve soldiers from matters per-
taining to military discipline); id. 49.16.4.5 (stating that those guilty of capital offenses
found trying to enlist shall be put to death); id. 49.16.4.6 (stating that enlistees dodging
court summons are to be dismissed and sent to court, even if innocent); PL.EP., supra note
1, at 6.31 (showing that Trajan emphasizes discipline in adultery trial of centurion); id. at
10.20 (explaining that soldiers are to remain with their units as much as possible, and not
to share duties with public slaves, where discipline might be weakened).
221. Dio, supra note 1, at 68.7.5 (reporting Trajan's maintenance of military disci-
pline).
222. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 541, at 171.
223. See BENNETT, supra note 44, at 122-24; see also PL.EP., supra note 1, at 6.22,
6.31.
224. See, e.g., DIG. 5.3.7pr (establishing priority of determining validity of a will before
determining validity of a grant of freedom under it); id. 48.16.10.2 (creating a thirty day
statute of limitations for successor of deceased accuser to renew charges against accused).
225. E.g., PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.96 (stating that anonymous accusations were not
to be entertained); DIG. 29.5.10.1 (providing for questioning of father's freedmen in case
involving death of son); id. 48.18.1.11 to .18.1.12 (providing for questioning under torture
of slaves in homicide cases; note that slaves always were questioned under torture-Tra-
jan's contribution was not the torture, but the leave to question); id. 48.18.1.19 (using evi-
dence obtained from slaves); id. 48.18.1.21 (explaining how a questioner should use "gen-
eral," not leading questions because the former are better suited to finding the truth); see
also id. 48.19.5pr (ordering that there was to be no criminal condemnation in absentia).
226. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.97 (barring anonymous accusations); cf id. at 10.34
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At least three of those four goals are present in Trajan's judi-
cial rulings on questions of inheritance, an area that comprises a
conspicuous part of his surviving work. Thus, his concern with
fairness caused him to respect the intent of the testator, even if
expressed imperfectly,2" and even if the testator failed to be-
queath the customary bribe to the emperor.229 His concern with
truth and judicial efficiency led him to insist on some formality in
will-making, even if minimal.20
All four of these goals are present in Trajan's celebrated pro-
scription against hunting down Christians and in his ban on
anonymous accusations.2' Anonymity encouraged mass accusa-
tions: Pliny's letter to the emperor mentions that a great number
were being accused,z 2 and one can imagine easily that those
numbers were threatening to overwhelm the slender judicial re-
sources availableY Second, anonymous accusations were not re-
liable sources of evidence. For similar reasons Trajan elsewhere
proscribed leading questions from judges.23 ' Third, Trajan was
trying to avoid the social divisions that had arisen under Domi-
tian through the practice of political posturing leading to mutual
(barring most private societies because of divisions they had caused); 10.93 (deferring to
local law, but stating that such societies sometimes are established to engage in riot and
lawlessness).
227. See, e.g., DIG. 26.7.12.1 (protecting buyers from having to return property to ward
sold by guardian in good faith; Trajan notes that this rule also protects wards by assuring
the marketability of guardianship property); id. 41.4.2.8 (holding that prescription allowed
in an item that guardian purchased at auction from estate in good faith); id. 48.17.5.2
(providing that fruit belonging to a missing person should be preserved and, if threatened
with spoilage, sold and the proceeds preserved for the owner); id. 48.19.5pr (ordering that
there will be no criminal condemnation in absentia); id. 40.5.26.7 (ordering that when a
master bound to manumit a slave fails to appear in court, the court grants liberty with the
same effect as if the master had done so); cf. G. INST. 3.72; J. INST. 3.7.4; COD. 7.6.1, 7.6.12
(ruling that the right of a patron to inherit from his client is not prejudiced by an imperial
grant of citizenship to the client where the patron either does not know of the grant or
otherwise does not consent).
228. E.g., DIG. 28.5.1pr (allowing change of normal order of clauses in a will); id.
29.1.1pr (allowing latitude in creation of military wills; but the pompous wording of this
mandatum sounds more like Nerva than Trajan).
229. Id. 36.1.31(30).5; cf id. 48.22.1 (no imperial seizure of goods of exiles).
230. J. INST. 2.6.1 (stating that mere loose talk about leaving someone as an heir does
not create a will); DIG. 29.1.24 (same).
231. PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.97.
232. Id. at 10.96.
233. A provincial governor judged cases himself, and his staff was quite small. See G.P.
Burton, Proconsuls, Assizes and the Administration of Justice Under the Empire, 65 J.
RoiMAN STuD. 92, 95, 105 (1975).
234. DIG. 48.18.1.21.
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denunciations." 5 Finally, Trajan's directions would be accepted
by most as more than fair: not only would the accused be given an
opportunity to face his accusers, but also if the accused renounced
Christianity and made the ritual gestures of loyalty to Rome, he
or she was automatically acquitted.236
V. CAN TRAJAN'S PRINCIPLES BE APPLIED TODAY?
The record of Trajan's government, at least to the extent that
record has survived, strongly suggests that governments can
more closely approximate the fiduciary pattern than does Ameri-
can government today. One can raise legitimate questions, how-
ever, about the closeness of the comparison. After all, it may be
said, Trajan ruled a less diverse people with simpler tools.
Moreover, he was not a democratically elected ruler, but largely
an autocrat, and autocrats should be bound by tighter standards.
First, regarding the challenges that diversity poses to govern-
ing, it is we, not Trajan, who have the advantage. The Roman
Empire was far more culturally diverse and polyglot than the
United States today. In addition to the two official tongues-
Latin and Greek-Roman subjects spoke several Celtic and Ger-
manic languages and other languages entirely outside the Indo-
European group (such as Hebrew, Arabic, Syraic, and Aramaic)
as well as Coptic and other African tongues. There was no com-
mon school system to meld together the radically different cul-
tures encompassed by the empire. It is true that Trajan reduced
his burden by respecting the laws and institutions of smaller,
more homogeneous levels of government-a crude kind of feder-
alism.23 But by laying down general principles for carefully se-
lected agents to adapt to local circumstances, Trajan was able to
maximize the use of the fiduciary principle, at least in decision-
making by the central government.
235. Pliny reports that "for a great many individuals of every age, both men and
women, are [by these charges] being brought to trial, and this is likely to continue. It is
not only the towns, but villages and rural districts too." PL.EP., supra note 1, at 10.96.
236. Id. at 10.96 to .97.
237. For recent expositions of the advantages of federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) and James O'Toole & Warren Bennis, Our Federalist Future:
The Leadership Imperative, CAL. MGMT. REV., June 22, 1992, at 73.
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As for comparative tools-it is again we who have the advan-
tage over Trajan. Even the fastest methods of communication
across the Roman Empire consumed days, sometimes weeks.
Transportation was limited to the speed of horses. The emperor's
"database" consisted of personal recollections, scrolls in the impe-
rial archives, letters from officials, petitions from citizens, and
any other materials he could obtain from distant libraries. The
communication, transportation, and information technology our
policymakers take for granted was utterly nonexistent.
As to the objection that Trajan's position was largely auto-
cratic, the fact of autocracy must be conceded-but how disposi-
tive is it? One can argue plausibly that, because in an elective
system the ballot box offers citizens an alternative unavailable in
an autocracy, periodic election renders fiduciary government less
necessary. Perhaps it is so. On the other hand, it is noteworthy
that our law concedes very limited force to this argument in pri-
vate sector relationships, such as incorporated and unincorpo-
rated associations, where managers usually are elected by those
they regulate. In the private sector, all officials-however cho-
sen-who culpably cause loss may be liable to the organization or
its members. Even sole selection does not bar recovery; the fact
that an employer hired a faithless agent does not immunize the
agent from the legal duty of indemnifying his employer.2 Only in
the public sector is it seriously contended that the ballot box is an
adequate remedy for official malice, self-seeking, or incompe-
tence.
But the ballot box alone is inadequate for protecting the public
from official misconduct. One reason is the small voice any one
person, or any one interest group, has in the election of the lead-
ers who target that person or group for unfair treatment. Another
is that the programs of today's welfare state create a trust-like
dependence on whomever is in office. The average retiree in the
United States today is almost certainly more dependent on sitting
federal lawmakers and their continued commitment to Social Se-
curity than the average civilian provincial retiree was dependent
on Trajan.
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958) (stating that agency requires con-
sent of the principal); id. § 399 (stating that an agent is liable to a principal for breach of
duty to such principal).
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Earlier in this article,239 1 set forth the spectrum of private sec-
tor relationships, ranging from one extreme: the arms-length
deal, where one party has little or no sway over the other, to the
other extreme: the private trust for children, where the man-
ager's power and the managed person's dependence are very
great. Because of the overwhelming power of government and the
difficulty people face in escaping any particular jurisdiction, one
can argue that the law should confine political discretion even
more tightly than it confines a trustee's discretion.
At this point, however, two more serious objections arise. Both
stem from a concern for the preservation of freedom. At the
power/dependence end of the fiduciary spectrum, the manager
disregards even the will of the beneficiaries and, instead, does
what the manager deems in their best interest, subject to exact-
ing judicial review. This model is inconsistent with our notions of
individual autonomy.24 ° Even Trajan, autocrat as he was, accom-
modated a considerable amount of citizen freedom." 1 Our model
should accommodate more.
A related objection is that application of overly exacting fiduci-
ary standards might replace rule by elected representatives with
rule by judiciary. Few of us would want to see judges as the cen-
tral arbiters of tax or regulatory policy. However, we need not
adopt a fiduciary model that requires this. Our model can allow a
certain deference to political judgment without affording politi-
cians "open seasons" on the liberties and fortunes of groups that
are out of favor.
It may be, therefore, that the most nearly appropriate fiduciary
model for government is the one now applied to private, non-
profit, democratic cooperative associations engaged in the long-
term management and conservation of important assets for their
members: housing and agricultural cooperatives, homeowners'
associations, and the like. These are the organizations that are
near, but not at, the trust end of spectrum-a score of "five out of
a possible six," so to speak.242 Officials of such associations enjoy
239. Supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
240. Compare, however, the government's "trust" relationship with Indian tribes, in
which Congress may disregard the will of the beneficiaries without the limitation of ex-
acting review. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
241. Supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
242. The scheme set forth above classifies relationships according to level of power and
GOVERNMENT AS FIDUCIARY
fairly broad discretion, but still are required to conduct them-
selves as nearly all of us would wish our government decision-
makers conducted themselves: in a fashion that is (1) disinter-
ested, (2) nondiscriminatory,2  (3) in good faith, (4) procedurally
reasonable, and (5) based on good information as to options and
empirically demonstrated consequences.2 " In some areas, public
decisionmaking already meets those standards-the U.S. Sen-
ate's deliberations over foreign policy come to mind. In other ar-
eas, they are the standards that most politicians already pretend
to meet.
In public law terms, such a standard suggests that courts re-
view exercises of political discretion with an "intermediate scru-
tiny" standard even if such regulations are now subject only to a
"rational relationship" test. A number of commentators have sug-
gested this approach in any event.24 However, even a looser
standard of review, for example, one comparable to the large cor-
poration version of the Business Judgment Rule, would be a step
toward more responsible government, even if it might leave poli-
ticians with more leeway than they either need or deserve.246
Some may argue that fiduciary government is not a worthy
goal at all. Certainly the goal will not appeal to those who still,
after all we experienced in the twentieth century, think that un-
bridled political power can create a better society. But there is
evidence that, given unweighted choices, most people, even most
people in civil government, would think fiduciary standards are a
dependence into six categories. Supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
243. Application of this principle would require increased use of compensation to people
suffering disproportionately from regulations purportedly adopted to further the general
welfare.
244. Although much policy decisionmaking still is guesswork, one merely observing the
political process might be surprised to learn that much of it no longer is, due to a plethora
of reasonably unbiased empirical studies on the real-world effects of public policy choices.
On education, see, for example, Eric A. Hanusek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources
on Student Performance: An Update, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLICY ANALYSIS 141
(1997). On government size, see, for example, James Gwartney, Robert Lawson & Randall
Holcombe, THE SIZE AND FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND EcONOiIC GROWTH, U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Economic Committee, at http/www.house.gov/jec/growth/function/function
.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
245. Professors Bernard H. Siegan and Richard Epstein both have proposed this ap-
proach. See Bernard H. Siegan & Richard Epstein, Recent Publications, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 791, 794 (1999) (reviewing Bernard H. Siegan, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND LAND USE REGULATION (1997)); Symposium, Richard Ep-
stein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Proceedings of the
Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49, 74 (1986).
246. Supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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good idea. Fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary standards are, after all,
what the decisionmakers in civil government themselves opt for
when judging people other than themselves. Such standards, un-
der many different names, 247 hold sway over all kinds of manag-
ers--except those employed in civil government.
Not only the adoption of such norms, but also the market itself
reveals such preferences. The almost universal absence of redis-
tributive devices in arrangements marketed to the general public
testifies to their ex ante unpopularity. 248 The almost uniform in-
sistence by politicians on their own good intentions and best ef-
forts, and their frequent repetition of the adage of President
Cleveland-that inestimable politician who really believed it-
that a public office is indeed a public trust, reflects their
perception that, even when they are not acting like fiduciaries,
the electorate wishes they were.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principles by which Trajan governed are a rebuke to our
own, less exacting, standards of public law. It is Trajan's applica-
tion of those principles, and not merely his adoption of a few
modern-sounding judicial procedural safeguards, that makes his
reign juristically important. This eminently practical soldier-
turned-emperor showed us that holding government to fiduciary
standards, even in a huge multicultural empire, is not merely a
noble ideal-but an attainable one.
247. For example, fiduciary duties, duties of utmost good faith, implied covenants of
fair dealing, etc. discussed supra notes 98-99, 118-123, 158-60, 192-93, 198, 206, 222 and
accompanying text.
248. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1547-54 (1982).
